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Abstract

TAXES AND DIVIDEND POLICIES: AN INTERNATIONAL STUDY
Chinwe Edna Nweke
Old Dominion University, 1994
Director: Dr. Bruce Seifert

The tax effects hypothesis states that dividends have a negative impact
on the value of a firm due to the preferential treatment given to capital gains
over dividend income in some countries. This study tests the tax effects
hypothesis in five countries: Australia, France, Germany, Japan and United
States. The countries are selected because each had a significant tax law
change within the period of study (1983-1991) and therefore provides an
excellent opportunity for validation of this hypothesis.
The tax effects hypothesis is tested by first examining the effects of tax
law changes on dividend payout ratios and then by studying the relationship
between expected return and dividend yield before and after a tax law change
in each country. A modified Capital Asset Pricing Model is used in examining
this relationship.
Dividend payout ratios, dividend yields and dividend growth rates are
calculated for each country to check if there are significant differences across

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

countries. The final section of the study uses data in the five countries to test
Lintner’s partial adjustment model.
The results show that
1.

There are some significant differences in payout ratios between the
countries. The Australian and German firms have the highest dividend
payout ratios while the French firms have the lowest dividend payout
ratios. Australian firms also have the highest dividend yields and growth
rates while Japanese firms have the lowest dividend yields and growth
rates.

2.

The post tax law dividend payout ratios of countries that increased the
tax disadvantage of dividend income generally decreased. While the
direction of the change in payout ratios supports the tax effects
hypothesis, the amount of the change is insignificant in some cases.

3.

A positive relationship between expected return and dividend yield is
observed in countries that have higher effective tax rates on dividend
income than capital gains. The relationship between expected return and
dividend yield is positive and significant in France, Germany (after the tax
law change), Japan and United States. An insignificant relationship is
observed in countries that have similar tax rates on dividend income and
capital gains. This is true for Australia and Germany (before the tax law
change). These results suggest that dividends have a negative impact
on the value of a firm and are consistent with the tax effects hypothesis.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

4.

Dividend behavior of firms in the countries can be explained by Lintner’s
model. The calculated payout ratios for Australia, France and U.S. are
similar to the actual payout ratios. The calculated payout ratios for
Germany and Japan are lower than the actual payout ratios but are
within the calculated range of the payout ratios. Australia and Germany
have the highest speed of adjustments among the five countries.
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Chapter 1

THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

I. Introduction
The effect of dividend policy on the value of a firm continues to be a
controversial topic in finance. The irrelevancy theory made popular by
Modigliani and Miller (1961) says that in a perfect market, the dividend policy of
a firm given its investment policy is irrelevant to the value of the firm. The
relevancy theory says that dividends have an effect on the value of a firm, but
there is no consensus on the nature or the source of this valuation effect.
The "bird-in-hand" fallacy says that investors’ need for current income or
dislike for uncertainty causes a firm’s stock price to be positively related to its
current dividend. This argument suggests that dividends have a positive effect
on the value of a firm.
The information effects hypothesis also suggests that dividends have a
positive effect on the value of a firm. However, the positive effect in this case
results from information asymmetry between investors and managers.
Managers use dividend payments to inform investors about the earnings
prospects of a firm.
1
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The tax effects hypothesis, however, indicates that dividends have a
negative impact on the value of a firm if dividends are taxed at a higher rate
than capital gains. The negative impact arises from the differential tax treatment
between dividend income and capital gains in countries that tax dividends at a
higher rate. Wealth maximizing investors therefore demand higher returns from
stocks that pay high dividends as a compensation for the higher taxes paid.

II. Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this research is to examine the tax effects hypothesis in
five countries namely Australia, France, Germany, Japan and United States.
These countries are selected because of the unique tax systems they adopted
and because each had a significant tax law change within the period of study,
1983-1991. These tax law changes provide a unique opportunity for evaluating
the validity of the tax effects hypothesis. This is achieved by first examining the
effects of a tax law change on dividend payout ratios and then by studying the
relationship between expected return and dividend yield before and after the tax
law change in each country. The final section of this study uses data in the five
countries to test Lintner’s partial adjustment model.

III. Importance of the Study and Statement of the Problem
Dividend policies of firms are very important because of their significant
impact in the private and business sectors. A major objective of shareholders

2

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

and management is maximization of shareholder’s wealth. If dividend policy
affects the value of a firm, it is only rational that shareholders and management
should strive to adopt the dividend policy that maximizes the value of the firm.
A firm’s dividend policy is also important to shareholders because dividend
income is a major source of income to some investors. These investors are
therefore affected by the dividend policies adopted by firms.
Firms’ dividend policies can also affect the economy. Retained earnings
constitute a major source of long-term growth in many corporations and
retained earnings are affected by dividend policies. Dividend policies can
therefore have a stabilizing effect on the economy through its effect on the long
term growth of firms. This is especially true if external financing is unavailable
or limited.
However, there is no conclusive evidence on the effect of dividend policy
on the value of a firm. The irrelevancy theory says that dividend policy does
not affect the value of a firm. The information effects hypothesis suggests that
dividends have a positive effect on the value of a firm while the tax effects
hypothesis says that dividends have a negative effect on the value of a firm (see
literature review in Chapter 2). These contradictory hypotheses leave an
important question in corporate finance still unanswered. Is the dividend policy
of a firm relevant or irrelevant to the value of the firm?
One common problem with previous dividend studies is the difficulty of
controlling for other relevant factors while examining the effects of dividend

3
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policy on the value of a firm. This study minimizes this problem by working with
countries that changed their tax system within the period of study. The
relationship between dividend policy and the value of the firm is examined
before and after a tax law change using the same group of firms.
Scarcity of data has also limited research in international dividend
policies. The few international dividend studies that are in the literature do not
specifically address valuation effects. This work adds to the literature by
evaluating the tax effects hypothesis and by providing comparative dividend
analysis on five countries including the U.S.
The world capital markets are becoming more integrated. Foreign
markets are opening up to international investors. Companies are listing their
stocks in foreign markets. Investors are now able to invest in foreign stocks at
reasonable costs and with less government interference. These recent
developments have necessitated the expansion of our knowledge on the
relationship between dividend policy and the value of a firm in other economies.
It is therefore important that dividend policies of other countries be studied.

IV. Scope of the Work
This study is directed at the following questions:
1.

Are there significant differences in average dividend payout ratios,
dividend yields and dividend growth rates between Australia, France,
Germany, Japan and United States?

4
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2.

What are the effects of a tax law change on dividend payout ratios in
each country?

3.

Can the tax effects hypothesis be used to explain the relationship
between dividend policy and the value of a firm?

4.

Can Lintner’s partial adjustment model be used to describe dividend
behavior of firms in the five countries?

V. Theoretical Framework
A firm’s dividend policy determines what proportion of the company’s
profit is paid out to shareholders. A firm can have a policy of paying all, none
or a fraction of its earnings as dividends. Different hypotheses have been used
to explain the effect of dividend policy (if any) on the value of a firm. The
different hypotheses are discussed in the next section.
The Irrelevancy theory says that in a perfect market, the dividend policy
of a corporation, given its investment policy, has no effect on its stock price.
This means that dividends are irrelevant to the value of the firm. Modigliani and
Miller (M & M) 1961 support the irrelevancy theory by deriving an equation that
gives the value of a firm as:
Tr##.x _ NOI^t+l) - i ^ t + i ) + v ^ t + i )
}
i +p(t+D

1

where V,(t) is the market value of the firm in period t,
NOI,(t+1) is the random future cash flows from operations for

5
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the ith firm at time (t+1),
l,(t+1) is the investment outlay for the ith firm at time (t+1),
V,(t+1) is the value of the firm at time (t+1) and
p(t+1) is the market-required rate of return at time (t+1).
This equation implies that neither dividends nor any variable that affects
dividends are relevant in the valuation of a firm. The value of a firm is the
discounted value of future earnings. Dividends do not affect earnings and
therefore should not affect the value of a firm. The future earnings of a firm
depend on previous investment decisions.
The assumptions underlying this irrelevancy argument are:
1.

There are no taxes. Rims’ earnings are not subject to corporate or
persona] taxes.

2.

There are no transaction costs. Shareholders can easily buy or sell
shares without incurring any transaction costs.

3.

There are no agency problems. The separation of management and
ownership is no problem because management always acts in the best
interest of the shareholders.

4.

There is no information asymmetry. Management and shareholders have
access to the same information.

5.

The investment and financing decisions of corporations are exogenous to
dividend policy. A firm that pays out all its earnings can still carry out
profitable investments by borrowing from the capital market.

6
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The opponents of the irrelevancy theory question the validity of these
assumptions. Firms and investors pay taxes on their earnings; investors do not
have the privilege of buying or selling shares without incurring transaction costs;
and sometimes there are conflicts of interest between management and
shareholders. Furthermore, investors and management do not always have
access to the same information and even if they do, investors do not always
understand the information they receive from the financial market Finally,
M & M’s assumption that investment decisions are independent of dividend
policy has also been questioned. Adoption of residual dividend policy by some
firms (whereby all positive Net Present Value projects are financed before any
dividends are paid), implies that investment and dividend policy decisions are
not completely independent of each other. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that
firms prefer to finance new investment with internal funds instead of external
funds that would expose the firm to scrutinies of the capital market This
suggests that there are some interactions between dividend policies, investment
policies and other financing policies. These doubts led to the advancement of
other hypotheses such as the information effect hypothesis, agency cost
hypothesis, and tax effects hypothesis in addition to the existing “bird-in-hand“
fallacy.
The "bird-in-hand" fallacy suggests that the need for current income or
resolution of uncertainty causes a firm's stock price to be positively related to its
current dividend. Firms that pay high dividends attract investors and the

7
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increased demand for shares drives up stock prices. This implies that current
dividends are better than uncertain future capital gains that may never be
realized. This view was prevalent before Modigliani and Miller (1961).
The information asymmetry hypothesis says that dividends are relevant
because they are used by management to communicate privileged information
about a firm’s performance to shareholders. It is the expectation of higher
current or future earnings that raises stock prices and not necessarily
shareholders’ preference for high dividends.
The Agency theory uses the conflict of interest between owner-managers
and outside investors to explain the valuation effects of dividends. Rozeff
(1982) suggests that an optimal dividend policy can be explained by a trade-off
between floatation costs of raising external capital and the benefit of reduced
agency costs. Agency cost arises when prospective investors charge, ex ante,
for the possibility that owner-managers may increase their personal wealth
through perquisites at the expense of investors. Owner-managers sometimes
choose to minimize these agency costs by incurring monitoring costs if such
costs are less than what prospective investors charge.
The tax effects hypothesis says that dividends have a negative impact on
the value of a firm. The basis of this argument is the differential tax treatment
between dividend income and capital gains. In countries where dividend
income is taxed at a higher rate than capital gains, investors in some tax
brackets may not maximize their after-tax return if they earn dividend income.

8
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These investors therefore demand higher returns as a compensation for the
higher taxes paid on dividend income. This implies that high dividends have a
negative effect on the value of a firm. This study focuses on the validation of
the tax effects hypothesis.
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Chapter 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The literature review is divided into four sections:
1.

Country comparative dividend studies

2.

Effects of tax law changes on dividend payout ratios

3.

Tax effects hypothesis on the value of a firm and

4.

Behavioral dividend partial adjustment models.

I. Country Comparative Dividend Studies
Two studies that compare dividend policies of different countries are
Khoury and Smith (1977) and Michel and Shaked (1986). Khoury and Smith
compare the dividend policies of Canadian and U.S. firms. They conclude that
U.S. firms generally have higher payout ratios and dividend yields than
Canadian firms. Michel and Shaked examine country and industry influences
on dividend policies in Japan and U.S. They find that dividend yields of U.S.
firms are generally higher than dividend yields of Japanese firms, while the
dividend payout ratios of Japanese firms are higher than those of U.S. firms.
These two studies indicate that there are differences in dividend payout ratios
10
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across countries.

II. The Effects of Tax Law changes on Dividend Pavout Ratios
Khoury and Smith (1977) examine the effects of the 1972 Canadian
Fiscal Tax Reform Act on dividend policies of Canadian firms. The Fiscal
Reform Act is a tax law change that introduced a capital gains tax and
increased the dividend tax credit in Canada. This tax law change made
dividends more attractive relative to capital gains for most investors. Khoury
and Smith compare the pre and post tax law means of dividend growth rates
and conclude that there is a significant difference between the two means.
Dividend growth rates increased from a pre-law average of 5% to a post-law
average of 10.01%. This indicates that Canadian firms increased the amount of
dividends paid after the tax law change. A similar comparison for the U.S.
sample, where there was no tax law change, did not reveal any significant
difference between the pre and post tax law means.
Morgan (1980) also studied the effect of the differential tax treatment of
dividends and capital gains after the 1972 Canadian tax law change. He
concludes that Canadian investors regarded dividend income and capital gains
as imperfect substitutes before the tax law change (i.e. capital gains were
preferred to dividend income). After the tax law change, the two were regarded
as perfect substitutes suggesting that people were indifferent to receiving
dividend income or realizing capital gains. This again implies that the tax law

11
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change affected dividend behavior of Canadian investors.
Ben-Horim, Hochman and Palmon (1987), Abruntyn and Turner (1990),
Gordon and Mackie-Mason (1990) and Bolster and Janjigian (1991) examine
the impact of the 1986 U.S. Tax Reform Act on dividend payout ratios.
Ben-Horim, Hochman and Palmon (1987), in a theoretical paper, predict that
payout ratios should increase after the tax law reform because of the elimination
of capital gains tax advantage. Abruntyn and Turner (1990) and Bolster and
Janjigian (1991) find no significant difference between the pre and post tax law
dividend payout means. Gordon and Mackie-Mason (1990), however, conclude
that the mean payout ratios increased after the tax law change.
Khoury and Smith (1977), Gordon and Mackie-Mason (1990) and
Ben-Horim, Hochman and Palmon (1987) suggest that changes in tax laws
affect dividend payout ratios. None of the above studies, however, adjusted for
macro-economic effects. This study adjusts for macro-economic influences in
examining the effect of tax law changes on dividend payout ratios.

III. The Effects of Dividend Policies on the Value of a Firm
Irrelevancy and relevancy are the two main theories on the relationship
between dividend policy and value of a firm.

12
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A.

The Irrelevancy Theory
The Irrelevancy theory says that the dividend policy of a corporation,

given its investment policy, has no effect on its stock prices in a perfect market
Dividend policy is therefore irrelevant to the value of a firm. The argument
underlying this theory was given in Chapter One. The two well-known studies
that provide empirical evidence in support of the irrelevancy theory are Black
and Scholes (1974) and Miller and Scholes (1982).
Black and Scholes (1974) test the relationship between the value of a
firm and its dividend policy by using the Capital Asset Pricing Model. They
argue that a firm that changes its dividend policy attracts as well as drives away
potential investors based on different individual preferences for dividends. The
net effect is that the policy change does not affect the firm’s value. They
conclude that returns on stocks with high dividend yields are not significantly
different from those with low yields. Miller and Scholes (1982) also find there is
no significant relationship between dividend yield and expected return. The
dividend policy of a firm is therefore irrelevant to its value. Huberman (1990)
relaxed the M & M’s (1961) no transaction cost assumption and still concludes
that dividends are irrelevant to shareholders’ welfare.

B.

The Relevancy Theory
The relevancy theory says that dividend policy affects the value of a firm,

though there is no consensus as to the nature or source of this valuation effect.

13
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Some argue that dividends have a positive impact on the value of a firm while
others say that the impact of dividends on the value of a firm is negative.

(1).

Positive Effects Argument: Early dividend studies by Graham and Dodd

(1951), Gordon (1959) and Durand (1959) examine the relationship between
dividend policy and value of a firm by regressing prices on aggregate dividends
and retained earnings. The equation used by these studies is given as follows:
p i . t = a + b D i v i , t + c R i , t + £ i#f

where Pi t is the price per share for firm i in period t,
Div, t is foe aggregate dividends paid by firm i in period t,
Ri t is retained earnings for firm i in period t and
elt is foe error term for firm i in period t
They find significant positive coefficients on foe dividend variable and conclude
that there is a positive relationship between dividends and foe value of a firm.
The results also show that foe dividend coefficient is significantly higher than foe
retained earnings coefficient Friend and Puckett (1964) used normalized
earnings to run foe regression and find that there is a positive relationship
between prices and dividends. They, however, note that foe difference between
foe dividend coefficient and foe earnings coefficient is smaller when normalized
earnings are used in foe regression.
Long (1978) and Poterba (1986) examine foe price behavior of two
classes of shares issued by Citizens Utilities Company. The two classes were
14
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identical in ail aspects except for the type of dividend paid. One group paid
cash dividends taxed at the investor’s personal tax rate while the other paid
stock dividends taxed at the capital gains rate. Both studies conclude that the
price of the stock class that paid cash dividends was generally higher though
Poterba finds that the two classes were priced equally in some periods.
Bailey (1988) also examines the price behavior of Canadian firms that
issued two classes of stocks. One class pad cash dividends while the other
realized capital gains. He concludes that equities that paid cash dividends sell
at a premium in some periods. He, however, notes that there is no evidence
to show that investors prefer cash income to equal amounts of capital gains.

(2).

Information Effects Hypothesis: The information asymmetry hypothesis

argues that the expectation of higher earnings and not necessarily
shareholders’ preference for high dividends raises stock prices. Empirical
testing has established that prices of shares rise when there is an unexpected
increase in dividends. Studies that provide empirical evidence in support of this
information effects argument are Pettit (1972), Pettit (1976), Watts (1973), Laub
(1976), Aharony and Swary (1980), Asquith and Mullins (1983), Woolridge
(1983), Kane, Lee, and Marcus (1984), Hess, Eades and Kim (1985), Ofer and
Siegel (1987), Lang and Litzenberger (1989), Elfakhani (1993) and Gweon, Lee
and Shin (1993).
Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) examine the reaction of share

15
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prices upon stock split announcements. They conclude that share prices
increase when a stock split announcement is accompanied by an
announcement of an effective increase in dividends. On the other hand, share
prices decrease when a stock split announcement is accompanied by an
announcement of an effective decrease in dividends.
Asquith and Mullins (1983) and Richardson, Sefcik, and Thompson
(1986) examine a sample of firms that either paid their first dividends or initiated
dividends after a 10-year break. Both studies find significant increases in stock
prices on the day the initial dividend announcements were made.
Miller and Rock (1985) argue that dividend announcements under
asymmetric information provide investors with information about the earnings
ability of a firm. An unexpected increase in dividends is interpreted as
management’s way of communicating to investors that a firm's earnings are
higher than expected. This good news drives up share prices and increases
the firm’s value.
Other theoretical papers that argue that prices of shares should rise
when there is an unexpected increase in dividends are Watts (1973), Watts
(1976), Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985), Ambarish, John and
Williams (1987), Ofer and Thakor (1987) and Williams (1988).

(3).

Aaencv Theory: Agency theory says that an optimum dividend policy

can be established by a trade-off between floatation costs of raising external

16
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capital and the benefit of reduced agency costs. Firms that pay a lot of
dividends use external financing more often than those that pay smaller
amounts of dividends and this results in high floatation costs. These firms,
however, have low agency costs because they are monitored more often by the
capital market The advantage of low agency cost and the disadvantage of
high floatation cost help determine an optimal dividend policy.
Rozeff examines the average dividend payout ratios of 1000 non
regulated firms in 64 industries between 1974 and 1980. He finds that dividend
payout is negatively related to the percentage of insiders. The higher the
percentage of insiders, the less the need to pay dividends to reduce agency
costs, and vice versa. He also finds that the number of outside stockholders is
positively related to dividend payout ratios (firms with a large number of outside
stockholders pay out more dividends to reduce high agency costs). His other
findings are that high growth firms and very risky firms have low dividend
payout ratios. Dempsey and Laber (1992) provide evidence consistent with
Rozeff (1982). They conclude that firms with low dividend payout ratios have
fewer shareholders and higher systematic risk. Easterbrook (1984) argues that
dividend payments force firms into the external markets where cost of
monitoring managers is low. Crutchley and Hansen (1989) conclude that firms
with higher expected floatation costs pay less dividends.
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(4).

Tax Effects Hypothesis: Proponents of the tax effects hypothesis argue

that a firm’s stock price may be negatively related to dividend yield if the tax
rate on dividend income is higher than the tax rate on capital gains. This
hypothesis therefore suggests that the stock price should be positively related
to the dividend yield if the tax rate on dividend income is less than the tax rate
on capital gains. If the tax effects hypothesis is correct, there should be a
positive relationship between expected return and dividend yields for countries
that have higher effective tax rates on dividend income than on capital gains
and vice versa.
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979), Litzenberger and Ramaswamy
(1982), Brennan (1970), Stone and Barter (1979), and Rosenberg and Marathe
(1979) examine the relationship between dividends and security returns using
the Capital Asset Pricing Model. They find a positive relationship between
expected return and dividend yield. Blume (1980) finds a U-shaped relationship
between dividend yield and expected return. Stocks that pay no dividends and
those that pay very large dividends provide the highest rate of return. Keim
(1985) also finds a U-shaped pattern but only for the month of January.
Amoako-Adu, Rashid and Stebbins (1992) study the effect of the
introduction of a $500,000 capital gains tax exemption on stock prices in
Canada and the reduction of this exemption to $100,000 two years later by
examining the price behavior of two groups of low and high dividend yield firms.
They find that the introduction of the $500,000 tax exemption increased stock
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prices of the low dividend yield group (capital gains stock). The subsequent
reduction in the capital gains tax exempt limit in 1987 resulted in an increase in
stock prices of the high dividend yield group. This suggests that a security’s
stock price is affected by its tax liability.
Masulis and Trueman (1988) examine the implications of differential
personal taxation for corporate investment and dividend decisions. They
conclude that shareholders prefer deferred dividends to dividend income
because of the tax advantage associated with capital gains. They note,
however, that unlimited deferral of dividend could be costly to a firm. Firms that
have excess retained earnings are very likely to invest in projects with
decreasing marginal rates of return. They argue that the tax advantage and the
cost disadvantage of capital gains cause shareholders in different tax brackets
to disagree over optimal investment and dividend policies.
Talmor and Titman (1990) suggest that investor’s preference for cash
dividends or stock repurchases depends on the stability of personal tax rates.
With constant personal tax rates, stock repurchases have tax advantages over
dividends because of the possibility of tax deferment With varying personal tax
rates, it becomes difficult to make any general statements because there are
some instances when dividends are preferred to capital gains. For example, if
personal tax rates are expected to increase in the future, shareholders would
rather receive dividend income and pay current taxes than realize future capital
gains that may be taxed higher.
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Chaplinsky and Seyhun (1990) suggest that investors try to reduce their
tax liability by avoiding dividend income that is taxed at a higher rate. Brennan
and Thakor (1990) conclude that despite the preferential tax treatment given to
capital gains, if the effective personal tax rate on dividends is low, shareholders
with low ownership holdings would prefer dividends while those with high
ownership holdings would prefer repurchases. Chen, Grundy and Stambaugh
(1990) could not find any evidence of a tax penalty associated with cash
dividends.
DeAngelo (1991) investigates why firms pay dividends at all, if there are
tax advantages associated with deferred income. He argues that there is a
strong relationship between tax deferral and consumption deferral because the
two are jointly supplied. If all firms in the economy decide to enjoy the tax
deferral advantage associated with capital gains, consumption deferral will
occur. This consumption deferral in turn creates a great demand for firms that
pay dividends because investors want to spread their consumption over time.

IV. Untner’s Partial Adjustment Model
Lintner (1956) examines the variables that affect dividend policies of
firms. His major conclusions are:
1.

Earnings are the most important variable in a firm’s dividend decision.

2.

Managers are very reluctant to make dividend policy changes that have
to be reversed within a short period.
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3.

Managers are more concerned with the rate of change in the existing
dividend payout ratio than with establishing a new dividend payout ratio.

Untner derived a dividend adjustment model for explaining the dividend
behavior of U.S. firms between 1918 and 1941. Untner’s model was able to
explain 85% of the changes in dividends in his sample.
Fama and Babiak (1968), Partington (1984), and Edelman, Baker and
Farreliy (1985), provide evidence in support of Untner’s model. Nakamura and
Nakamura (1985) and Nakamura (1989) use Untner’s model on a sample of
Japanese firms. Nakamura and Nakamura (1985) conclude that including a
lagged earnings variable in the equation improves the explanatory power of the
model. This result is consistent with Fama and Babiak (1968). Nakamura
(1989) also concludes that estimating Untner’s model by using a sample of
firms with both dividend increases and decreases may lead to a specification
error. He estimates the model differently for firms that increased dividends and
for those that decreased dividends.

V. Summary of Existing Research
A review of the existing literature indicates that previous research
concentrated on U.S. firms with little attention given to the dividend policy of
firms in other countries. There are also contradictory hypotheses on the effect
of dividend policy on the value of a firm. The irrelevancy theory says that there
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is no relationship between the value of a firm and dividend policy. The
information effects hypothesis suggests that dividends have a positive impact
on the value of a firm, while the tax effects hypothesis implies that dividends
have a negative effect on the value of a firm. Previous empirical studies provide
evidence in support of each hypothesis. These contradictory empirical results
call for more research in the relationship between dividend policy and the value
of a firm.
This study examines the relationship between dividends and the value of
a firm before and after a tax law change in countries that had a significant tax
law change. The previous studies have been criticized on the grounds that
information effects may have introduced some bias in the results. This problem
is minimized in this study because any such biases should apply equally to the
pre and post tax law periods. Any change in the relationship between the
dividend policy and the value of a firm after a tax law change can therefore be
partly attributed to tax effects. This study also employs a variation of the
Capital Asset Pricing Model that avoids the shortcoming of a beta-based model.
Market value of equity and ratio of book-to-market value of equity are used as
alternative risk variables.
Lintner’s model has been tested with U.S. data and recently with
Japanese data. The application of this model to data in other countries adds to
the literature of dividend policies.
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CHAPTER 3

TAX ENVIRONMENT IN THE FIVE COUNTRIES AND STUDY DESIGN

I. Tax Environment
The main tax systems used in different countries are the classical and
integrated tax systems. The classical tax system makes no distinction between
retained and distributed profits. Corporate profits are taxed twice; once at the
corporate level and again at the personal level. This is known as the "economic
double taxation" of dividends. The integrated tax system is a system where the
incidence of economic double taxation is partly reduced or eliminated. A
system that partially reduces the double taxation is called a partial integration
system and one that eliminates the double taxation completely is called a full
integration or full imputation system.
Full integration can be achieved at the corporate or shareholders’ level.
At the corporate level, companies are exempt from paying taxes on distributed
income but dividends received by investors are taxed. At the shareholders’
level, full integration is achieved by allowing shareholders to claim full credit for
taxes paid by the corporation.
Partial integration can be achieved at the corporate or shareholders’ level
23
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also. The two systems used to reduce double taxation at the corporate level
are the split-rate system and the partial dividend reduction system, in the spiitrate system, retained and distributed profits are taxed differently. Usually, the
distributed profits are taxed at a lower rate to compensate for the extra taxes
that are paid on dividends. The partial dividend deduction system allows
companies to deduct some percentage of gross dividends paid in calculating
taxable profits. For example, firms may be allowed to deduct 20% of the
amount of cash dividends paid. This allows firms to reduce taxes on distributed
profits.
Two ways to reduce the double taxation at the shareholders’ level are the
partial imputation system and the partial shareholder relief system. In the partial
imputation system, retained and distributed profits are taxed at the same rate
but shareholders receive partial credit for corporate taxes paid on distributed
profit The partial shareholder relief system allows domestic shareholders partial
credit for corporate taxes paid. The tax system in each country and the tax law
changes are discussed in the next section.

II. Australian Tax System and Tax Law Changes
Australia had the classical tax system in the early 80’s. The maximum
corporate tax was 46% and the maximum personal tax rate was 60%. The
personal tax rates were considered high by Australian citizens. These high
rates coupled with poor economic conditions led to tax avoidance and evasion.
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These events led to the call for tax law changes. The tax reform movement
started in 1984 and the content of the tax amendment was announced in
September 1985. A major objective of the tax reform was to reduce individual
marginal tax rates. The highest personal marginal tax rate was reduced from
60% to 55% in 1986 and later to 48.3% in 19871. The new tax law also
introduced a foil imputation system in 1987. This system eliminated the double
taxation of dividends because shareholders are credited with the full taxes paid
by firms. The imputation system necessitated the re-classification of dividends.
Dividends paid from profits already taxed at the corporate level are classified as
"franked" dividends. These are exempted from any taxes at the shareholder’s
level. "Unfranked" dividends are paid from company profits that haven’t been
taxed, and therefore are subject to taxes at the shareholder’s level. The
Australian imputation system does not provide cash refunds on imputation
credits. The corporate tax rate was temporarily increased from 46% to 49% to
partly finance the cost of changing from a classical to an imputation system.
This rate was later reduced to 39% in 1988. Dividend payments and capital
gains are taxed at the personal tax rate in Australia

III. French Tax System and Tax Law Changes
France currently has a partial imputation system in which corporate taxes
are partially refunded to shareholders as tax credits. The partial credit rate is

1The current highest personal tax rate is 49%.
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50%. This is called the "avoir fiscal". If the "avoir fiscal" exceeds the income tax
liability, the excess is refunded to shareholders. Dividends are taxed as
ordinary income while capital gains are taxed at a special rate.
France reduced its corporate tax rate from 50% to 45% in 1986 and
further to 42% in 1987. The highest individual tax rate was also reduced from
65% to 58% in 1986 and later to 56.8% in 1987. In 1989, France had a major
tax reform when it introduced the split-rate tax system. Under this system, the
corporate tax rate on distributed profit was maintained at 42% but the rate on
retained profits was reduced to 34%. The capital gains tax rate was also
increased from 15% to 18.1%. The capital gains tax rate is a flat rate that
applies if a shareholder holds more than 25% of the shares in a company or if
proceeds from a sale of shares exceed a certain limit per year. This limit is
FF251.500 (equivalent to $41,508 in 1988) before the tax law change and
FF307.600 (equivalent to $53,246 in 1989) after the tax law change in 1989.

IV. German Tax System and Tax Law Changes
The German tax system is one of the most stable in the industrialized
world. Germany introduced the full imputation and split-rate systems in 1976.
The full imputation system allows shareholders to claim full credit for taxes paid
at the corporate level. If the tax credit exceeds the income tax, shareholders
can file for a refund. The tax rate on retained profit was 56% but this was
reduced to 50% in 1990. The rate on distributed profit remained unchanged at
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36%. The 1990 tax law change also reduced the highest personal tax rate from
56% to 53%. Dividend income in Germany is taxed as ordinary income while
capital gains are tax exempt except for gains from sale of land owned for less
than two years and these are taxed at the normal income tax rate.

V. Japanese Tax System and Tax Law Changes
Japan had a split-rate system before they changed to a partial
shareholder relief system in 1990. In the Japanese split-rate system, the
corporate tax rate on distributed profit was 32%, while the rate on retained
earnings was 42%. The highest personal tax rate was 57%. The partial
shareholder relief system allows domestic shareholders to deduct 5% of their
dividend income from their personal tax liability at the federal level. The
corporate tax rate was reduced to 37.5% after the 1990 tax law change and the
highest personal tax rate was reduced to 35%. The tax law change introduced
a 20% flat capital gains rate.

VI. United States Tax System and Tax Law Changes
United States has the classical tax system. Companies pay taxes on
earnings and shareholders pay personal taxes on dividend income. The 1986
Tax Reform Act was a major tax law change in the U.S. and became effective in
January 1987. The mayor objectives of the Reform Act were the reduction of
rates and the elimination of the tax advantage accorded capital gains. The
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corporate rate was reduced from 46% to 34%2 and the top individual rate was
reduced from 50% to 31%3. Before the tax law change, the highest capital
gains rate was 20% while the highest tax rate on dividend income was 50%.
The tax law change eliminated the preferential treatment given to capital gains.
Both capital gains and dividend income are now taxed as ordinary income. The
summaries of the tax systems and the tax rates in the five countries are
provided in Tables 1 and 2.

2Starting from 1987, an additional 5% is levied on income between $100,000 and
• $335,000.
^The highest personal tax rate immediately after the tax law change in 1987 was
38.5% and this was later reduced to 31% in 1988. The 31% top tax bracket includes
an additional 5% levied on income over $49,300 for single people and $82,150 for
married couples.
28
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Table 1: Tax Systems in Effect in the Countries Under Study (1983-1991)

Country

Before the Tax Law
Change

After the Tax Law
Change

Date of
Change

Australia

Classical system

Full imputation
system

1987

France

One corporate rate
and partial imputation
system

Split-rate and partial
imputation system

1989

Germany

Split-rate and full
imputation system

Split-rate and full
imputation system with
rate reductions

1990

Japan

Split-rate system

Partial shareholder
relief system

1990

U.S.

Classical tax system

Classical tax
system with 1986
Reform Act

1987

Source:

Taxing Profits in a Global Economy Domestic and International
Issues. OECD Publication, 1991.
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Table 2:

Summary of the Tax Rates in the Five Countries (1983-1991)

Panel A:

Highest Corporate Tax Rates in the Five Countries

Country

Before the Tax
Law Change

Effective Date
of Change

After the Tax
Law Change

Australia
France
Germany
Japan
U.S.

46.0%
50.0%
36(D) 56(R)%
32(D) 42(R)%
46.0%

1987
1989
1990
1990
1987

49.0%*
42(D) 34(R)%
36(D) 50(R)%
37.5%
34.0%

D is distributed profit
R is retained profit

Panel B:

Highest Marginal Personal Tax Rates on Dividend
Income in the Five Countries

Country

Before the Tax
Law Change

Effective Date
of Change

After the Tax
Law Change

Australia
France
Germany
Japan
U.S.

60.0%
57.9%
56.0%
57.0%
50.0%

1987
1989
1990
1990
1987

48.3%*
57.9%
53.0%
35.0%
31.0%

Panel C:

Maximum Capital Gains Tax Rates in the Five Countries

Country

Before the Tax
Law Change

Effective Date
of Change

After the Tax
Law Change

Australia
France
Germany
Japan
U.S.

60.0%
15.0%

1987
1989
1990
1990
1987

48.3%
18.1%

-

20.0%

-

20.0%
31.0%

*The 1991 highest corporate and marginal personal tax rates are 39% and 49% respectively.
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VII. Calculation of Effective Tax Rates

As stated earlier, the five countries changed their tax laws within the
period of study. The total effective rates on dividend income and capital gains
are calculated before and after a major tax law change in each country. The
tax law changes in Australia, France and Japan are considered major because
these countries changed their tax systems. Though Germany only had a
reduction of rates, this is also considered major because the German tax
system has been very stable over the years. The 1986 Tax Reform Act in U.S.
is a major tax law change because it eliminated the tax advantage accorded to
capital gains over dividend income.
It is not possible to determine if there is a tax preference for dividend
income or capital gains in each country by simply looking at the corporate and
personal tax rates since different countries have different tax features (see
Tables 1 and 2). The tax rates in conjunction with the different tax systems are
used to calculate the total effective tax rates under three scenarios:
Scenario 1: All corporate earnings are paid as dividends.
Scenario 2: No dividends are paid but capital gains are realized.
Scenario 3: No dividends are paid and capital gains are not realized.
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The major assumptions initially used in calculating the total effective rates are as
follows:
1.

Tax payers are in the top marginal tax bracket4.

2.

Tax payers are in the top capital gains tax bracket4.

3.

Tax payers face federal government tax only.

The formulas used in obtaining the effective tax rates for each country are given
in Table 3.

''These assumptions are later relaxed.
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Table 3:

Formulas Used for the Calculation of Effective Tax Rates

Scenario

1

2

3

Australia
Before

T + (1-T)M

T + (1-T)g

T

After

T + [(1-T) + T]M - T = M*

T

T

France
Before

T + [(1-T) + c(1-T)]M - c(1-T)

T + (1-T)g

T

After

T + [(1-T) + c(1-T)]M - c(1-T)

T* + (l-T ^g

T*

Germany
Before

T + [(1-T) + TIM - T

T*

T*

After

T + [(1-T) + TjM - T

T*

T*

Japan
Before

T + (1-T)M - c(1-T)

T"

1"

After

T + (1-T)M - c(1-T)

T + (1-T)g

T

U.S.
Before

T + (1-T)M

T + (1-T)g

T

After

T + (1-T)M

T + (1-T)g

T

where T is the corporate tax rate,
T* is the corporate tax rate on retained profits for countries using the
split-rate system,
M is the personal tax rate on dividends,
g is the capital gains tax rate and
c is the partial credit rate.
Scenario 1: All corporate earnings are paid as dividends.
Scenario 2: No dividends are paid but capital gains are realized.
Scenario 3: No dividends are paid and capital gains are not realized.
* Total tax liability in Australia is M (if M > T) and T (if M < T), but the
highest marginal tax rate is 48.3% which is less than T. This means that effectively
the total tax liability is T.
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The effective tax rates are calculated for the pre and post tax law
periods. A summary of the effective tax rates is given in Table 4 and the details
of the calculations are given in Appendix A. These rates show that before the
tax law changes, investors in the highest tax bracket in France, Japan and U.S.
were clearly better off with realized and unrealized capital gains than with
dividend income. In Australia, the unrealized capital gains option maximized
shareholders’ wealth. However, the effective rates on dividend income and
realized capital gains options were the same which suggests that investors
should be indifferent to the dividend income and realized capital gains options.
In Germany, the investors were indifferent to all three options.
After the tax law changes, investors in the highest tax bracket in France
and Japan were still better off with realized and unrealized capital gains than
with dividend income. Investors in Germany were slightly better off with capital
gains (realized and unrealized) while investors in Australia were indifferent to the
three options. In U.S., the investors were indifferent to dividend income and
realized capital gains but the unrealized capital gains option still maximized
shareholders’ wealth.
The results of these calculations suggest that shareholders’ wealth may
be affected positively or adversely depending on the nature of the tax law
change. If the tax effects hypothesis is correct, then there should be a positive
relationship between dividend yield and the value of a firm in countries that have
higher effective rates on dividends. This relationship is therefore examined
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before and after the tax law changes to see if there are any changes due to the
tax law changes.
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Table 4:

Summary of Effective Tax Rates for Investors in the
Highest Tax Bracket

Panel A:

Effective Tax Rates Before the Tax Law Change

Country

Dividends
Paid

Cap. Gains
Realized

Cap. Gains
Unrealized

Australia

78.40%

78.40%

46.00%

France

68.43%

57.50%*

50.00%

Germany

56.00%

56.00%

56.00%

Japan

67.36%

42.00%

42.00%

U.S.

73.00%

56.80%

46.00%

Panel B:

Effective Tax Rates After the Tax Law Change

Country

Dividends
Paid

Cap. Gains
Realized

Cap. Gains
Unrealized

Australia

49.00%

49.00%

49.00%

France

63.37%

45.95%*

34.00%

Germany

53.00%

50.00%

50.00%

Japan

56.25%

50.00%

37.50%

U.S.

54.46%

54.46%

34.00%

5lt is assumed that investors pay the capital gains tax.
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The preceding calculations were based on the assumption that investors
were in the highest personal and capital gains tax bracket This assumption
was relaxed and the effective tax rates for investors in other personal tax
brackets were calculated. These rates are shown in Table 5.
The shareholders’ wealth in all tax brackets in Australia, Japan and U.S.
were maximized with the unrealized capital gains option before the tax law
change. After the tax law change, Japanese and U.S. shareholders in all tax
brackets were still better off with unrealized capital gains while shareholders in
all tax brackets in Australia were indifferent to all options.
In France, shareholders in three tax brackets were better off with
dividend income than with unrealized capital gains before the tax law change.
After the tax law change, shareholders in only two tax brackets were still better
off with dividend income. This means that shareholders in one tax bracket who
used to be better off with dividend income became better off with unrealized
capital gains after the tax law change.
Shareholders in five of the six tax brackets were better off with dividend
income than with unrealized capital gains in Germany before the tax law
change. After the tax law change, investors in only three of the five tax
brackets were still better off with dividend income. This suggests that the tax
law change provided incentives for investors in two tax brackets to opt for
capital gains rather than dividend income.
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Table 5:

Effective Tax Rates for Other Tax Brackets
Before the Tax Law Change

------------------------------ ,----------- -------------------------------------

Australia
Dividend
Income

Personal
Tax Rate

Realized
Cap. Gains

Unrealized
Cap. Gains

20.0%

56.80%

56.80%*

46.0%

38.0%

66.52%

65.52%

46.0%

46.0%

70.84%

70.84%

46.0%

48.3%

72.08%

72.08%

46.0%

60.0%

78.40%

78.40%

46.0%

France
5.0%

28.75%

57.50%**®

50.0%

24.0%

43.00%

57.50%

50.0%

29.0%

46.75%

57.50%

50.0%

49.0%

61.75%

57.50%

50.0%

57.9%

68.43%

57.50%

50.0%

Germany
19.2%

19.2%

56.0%

56.0%

29.6%

29.6%

56.0%

56.0%

36.9%

36.9%

56.0%

56.0%

51.5%

51.5%

56.0%

56.0%

53.0%

53.0%

56.0%

56.0%

56.0%

56.0%

56.0%

56.0%

J n Australia, capital gains are taxed at the same rate as dividend income, therefore m = g.
"The 15% capital gains tax rate in France is a flat rate that applies if proceeds from the sale of
shares exceed FF251,500 (equivalent to $41,508 in 1988) per year or if the shareholder holds
more than 25% of the shares in a company.

6See footnote 5.
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Table 5 Continued

Japan.

(

Personal
Tax Rate

Dividend
Income

Realized
Cap.
Gains

Unrealized
Cap. Gains

20.0%

42.20%

42.0%

42.0%

30.5%

49.24%

42.0%

42.0%

35.0%

52.40%

42.0%

42.0%

57.0%

67.36%

42.0%

42.0%

U.S.
15.0%

54.10%

54.10%

46.0%

28.0%

61.12%

56.80%*”

46.0%

31.0%

62.74%

56.80%

46.0%

50.0%

73.00%

56.80%

46.0%

” *The highest capital gains tax rate in U.S. was 20%.
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Table 5 Continued
Panel B:

Effective Tax Rates for Other Tax Brackets
After the Tax Law Change

AUSTRALIA
Personal
Tax Rate

Dividend
Income

Realized
Cap. Gains

Unrealized
Cap. Gains

20.0%

49.0%

49.0%

49.0%

38.0%

49.0%

49.0%

49.0%

46.0%

49.0%

49.0%

49.0%

48.3%

49.0%

49.0%

49.0%

France
5.0%

17.35%

45.95%*7

34.0%

24.0%

33.88%

45.95%

34.0%

29.0%

38.23%

45.95%

34.0%

49.0%

55.63%

45.95%

34.0%

57.9%

63.37%

45.95%

34.0%

Germany
19.2%

19.2%

50.0%

50.0%

29.6%

29.6%

50.0%

50.0%

36.9%

36.9%

50.0%

50.0%

51.5%

51.5%

50.0%

50.0%

53.0%

53.0%

50.0%

50.0%

‘The 18.1% capital gains tax rate in France is a flat rate that applies if proceeds from the sale of
shares exceed FF307.600 (equivalent to $53,246 in 1989) per year or if the shareholder holds
more than 25% of the shares In a company.

7See footnote 5.
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Table 5 Continued

Japan.

|

Personal
Tax Rate

Dividend
Income

Realized
Cap.
Gains

Unrealized I
Cap. Gains

20.0%

46.88%

50.0%**

37.5%

30.5%

53.44%

50.0%

37.5%

35.0%

56.25%

50.0%

37.5%

U.S.
15.0%

43.90%

43.90%*“

34.0%

28.0%

52.48%

52.48%

34.0%

31.0%

54.46%

54.46%

34.0%

**The 20% capital gains tax rate in Japan is a flat rate.
***ln the U.S., capital gains are taxed at the same rate as dividend income,
therefore m = g.
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vni. study Pesign
The main source of data for this study is the Disclosure-World Scope
data base. This data base provides annual financial information on public firms
all over the world. The use of one data source for all countries minimizes data
inconsistencies and different standards that are often encountered with different
data sources. Information on corporate and personal tax rates and the tax
systems in each country are obtained from Price Waterhouse Tax Handbook
International Tax Summaries, and Organization for Economic-Cooperation and
Development (OECD) publications. These sources provide details of different
tax issues in many countries. The risk free rates are obtained from International
Financial Statistics.
The criteria used for firm selection are as follows:
1.

All firms must be industrial companies

2.

The firms must have complete data for all the relevant variables for the
period of study and

3.

The fiscal year dates for all the companies must not be more than three
months apart
The use of only industrial firms is an effort to keep the data more

homogeneous because U.S. dividend studies have shown that dividend payout
ratios for utilities are very high compared to those of other industries. Harkins
and Walsh Jr. (1971) report that the average payout ratios for utility companies
range from 47% to 82%. Michel (1979) also finds that dividend payout ratios for
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electric firms range from 65% to 73%. The selection of firms with complete data
for the relevant variables for the entire period means that only “successful" firms
are used. This criterion introduces a selection bias but this is necessary to
ensure continuity. Most of the firms used have the same end of year fiscal
dates with only a few that are three months or less apart
The period of study is between 1983 and 1991, a nine year period. This
period is chosen because complete financial data for international dividends is
not readily available for longer periods. The distribution of firms that meet all
the criteria is given below.

COUNTRY

NO. OF FIRMS

Australia

37

France

107

Germany

80

Japan

252

U.S.

372

Disdosure-Worldscope data is stored in CD-ROM. The data for all firms
listed in each country are first down-loaded to a floppy disk. The data are later
transferred to a Quattro Pro program where all the firms are sorted according to
industry group and screened. The data analysis is done with SAS programs.
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CHAPTER 4

COUNTRY COMPARATIVE DIVIDEND STUDIES

I. Introduction
Two studies that compare dividend policies of different countries are
Khoury and Smith (1977) and Michel and Shaked (1986). Khoury and Smith
compare the dividend payout ratios and dividend yields for Canadian and U.S
firms. They conclude that U.S. dividend payout ratios and dividend yields are
significantly higher than those of the Canadians. Michel and Shaked find that
dividend yields for U.S. firms are significantly higher than dividend yields of
Japanese firms, while dividend payout ratios of Japanese firms are higher than
those of U.S. firms. These results suggest that there are differences in dividend
payout ratios across countries. In this study, dividend payout ratios, dividend
yields and dividend growth rates in Australia, France, Germany, Japan and U.S.
are compared for any significant differences.

II. Methodology
The nine-year means and the yearly means of dividend payout ratios,
dividend yields and dividend growth rates are calculated for each country.
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These means are compared by conducting a Tukey "means difference" test
This test is used because it is more suitable for multiple comparisons. The
Tukey-Kramer method considers two means to be significantly different if

S[(i/Jrri/t)/3i^>'?(‘;*-v)..............

3

where y, and y, are means of group i and j respectively,
s is the mean square error for the one way Anova model,
n, is the number of observations in group i and
q(a;k,v) is the a-ievel critical value of standardized range distribution of k
independent normal variables with v degrees of freedom.
A 5% significance level is used to see if there are any significant differences
between the countries.

III. Results
The results of the inter-country comparison show that there are
significant differences across countries. Table 6 shows the means and
standard deviations of dividend payout ratios, dividend yields and dividend
growth rates for the nine-year period.
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Table 6:

Summary Statistics for Dividend Payout Ratios, Dividend
Yields and Dividend Growth Rates for the Period 1983 -1991

Country

Dividend Payout
Ratios

Dividend Yield

Dividend Growth

Mean

Mean Std.Dev.

Mean Std.Dev.

Std.Dev.

Australia

0.5273 0.1755

A

0.0477 0.0169

A

France

0.2563 0.1577

C

0.0214 0.0119

B 0.1089 0.1146 AB

Germany

0.5112 0.2056

A

0.0231 0.0098

B 0.0721 0.1065 CB

Japan

0.3348 0.1544

B

0.0099 0.0037

C 0.0518 0.0585 C

U.S.

0.3148 0.2102

B

0.0229 0.0160

B 0.0572 0.1077 C

0.1306 0.1116 A

Means that have the same letter are not significantly different
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For the entire period, Australia has the highest average dividend payout
ratio of 52.73%, followed by Germany, Japan and U.S. with average dividend
payout ratios of 51.12%, 33.48% and 31.48% respectively. France has the
lowest dividend payout of 25.63%. The Tukey "means difference" test indicates
that dividend payout means for Australian and German firms are not significantly
different However, these two means are significantly different from the payout
means of France, Japan and U.S. The dividend payout ratios of Japan and U.S
are not significantly different from each other but are significantly higher than
that of France.
The dividend yield means for Australia, Germany, U.S., France, and
Japan are 4.77%, 2.31%, 2.29%, 2.14% and 0.99% respectively. The dividend
yields for the Australian firms are significantly higher those of the other
countries. The dividend yields for the German, U.S. and French firms are not
significantly different from each other. The dividend yields for the Japanese
firms are significantly lower than those of the other four countries.
Australia also has the highest dividend growth rate of 13.06%. France is
next with a growth rate of 10.89%, followed by Germany with 7.21%. United
States dividend growth rate is 5.72% and Japan has the lowest growth rate of
5.18%. The Australian and French dividend growth rates are not significantly
different, but are significantly different from those of the other countries. The
average dividend growth rates for Germany, Japan and U.S. are not significantly
different
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For the entire period, the results show that the Japanese market exhibits
the lowest degree of variability in the three statistics. The U.S. market exhibits
the highest variability in dividend payouts. The Australian market exhibits the
highest variability in dividend yield, while the French market exhibits the highest
variability in dividend growth rate.
The yearly means and standard deviations of the three variables are
shown in Table 7. An examination of the yearly means of dividend payout
ratios and dividend yields in each country shows that they are fairly stable while
the growth rates tend to be more volatile.
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Table 7:

Summary Statistics for the Five Countries

Panel A:

The Yearly Means of Dividend Payout Ratios (1983-1991)

| Year

Australia

France

Germany

Japan

U.S.

0.4844

0.3037

0.5281

0.3491

0.3111

R Std.Dev.

0.3080

0.2729

0.3375

0.2610

0.2636

Mean

0.4979

0.2616

0.5225

0.3404

0.3083

Std.Dev.

0.2724

0.2647

0.3050

0.2456

0.2693

Mean

0.4820

0.2622

0.5323

0.3433

0.3127

Std.Dev.

0.2317

0.2582

0.3021

0.2492

0.2803

Mean

0.4780

0.2775

0.5212

0.3584

0.3211

Std.Dev.

0.2627

0.2622

0.3031

0.2479

0.2983

Mean

0.5713

0.2573

0.5270

0.3434

0.3030

Std.Dev.

0.2440

0.2227

0.3000

0.2567

0.2714

Mean

0.5315

0.2616

0.5136

0.3382

0.2948

Std.Dev.

0.2545

0.2232

0.2741

0.2207

0.2670

0.5571

0.2070

0.4544

0.3031

0.3013

Std.Dev.

0.2410

0.1587

0.2807

0.1834

0.2758

Mean

0.6381

0.2401

0.4930

0.3224

0.3351

Std.Dev.

0.2300

0.1876

0.2708

0.2223

0.3037

Mean

0.5051

0.2361

0.5085

0.3153

0.3458

Std.Dev.

0.3613

0.1805

0.2827

0.2157

0.3469

| Stats.

I 1983 I Mean

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989 I Mean

1990

1991
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Table 7 Continued

Panel B:
Year

The Yearly Means of Dividend Yields (1983-1991)
Stats.

Australia

France

Germany

Japan

U.S.

Mean

0.0531

0.0250

0.0243

0.0148

0.0245

Std.Dev.

0.0285

0.0225

0.0145

0.0800

0.0186

Mean

0.0463

0.0204

0.0266

0.0128

0.0269

Std.Dev.

0.0238

0.0174

0.0150

0.0078

0.0201

Mean

0.0394

0.0234

0.0223

0.0125

0.0231

Std.Dev.

0.0222

0.0116

0.0119

0.0074

0.0175

Mean

0.0478

0.0222

0.0279

0.0103

0.0217

Std.Dev.

0.0248

0.0173

0.0127

0.0059

0.0166

Mean

0.0434

0.0184

0.0207

0.0133

0.0209

Std.Dev.

0.0138

0.0132

0.0152

0.0044

0.0175

Mean

0.0448

0.0213

0.0238

0.0060

0.0213

Std.Dev.

0.0171

0.0138

0.0123

0.0030

0.0174

Mean

0.0600

0.0167

0.0188

0.0054

0.0206

Std.Dev.

0.0292

0.0109

0.0115

0.0022

0.0169

Mean

0.0623

0.0232

0.0226

0.0061

0.0268

| Std.Dev.

0.0399

0.0166

0.0153

0.0025

0.0248

0.0322

0.0220

0.0211

0.0072

0.0206

0.0238

0.0185

0.0139

0.0030

0.0181

1983
1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991 I Mean
| Std.Dev.
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Table 7 Continued:

Panel C: The Yearly Means of Dividend Growth Rates (1983-1991)

Year

Stats.

Australia

France

Germany

1983

Mean

0.1359

0.0465

0.0999

0.0435

0.0532

Std.Dev.

0.3451

0.3166

0.3486

0.2451

0.3173

Mean

0.0649

0.0330

0.0985

0.0419

0.0915

Std.Dev.

0.3234

0.2743

0.3505

0.2257

0.2607

Mean

0.1606

0.1383

0.0943

0.0640

0.0598

Std.Dev.

0.3366

0.3621

0.4427

0.1862

0.2377

Mean

0.0930

0.1735

0.0344

0.0210

0.0231

Std.Dev.

0.3204

0.4279

0.2919

0.2712

0.2785

Mean

0.3300

0.1985

0.0278

-0.0196

0.0511

Std.Dev.

0.3246

0.3018

0.2982

0.3162

0.2490

Mean

0.1709

0.1905

0.0781

0.0511

0.0593

Std.Dev.

0.4518

0.2884

0.3327

0.3061

0.2174

Mean

0.3682

0.1602

0.0682

0.1538

0.0700

Std.Dev.

0.4498

0.3672

0.2915

0.2793

0.2222

Mean

0.0196

0.0758

0.0840

0.0711

0.0476

Std.Dev.

0.4370

0.3027

0.3349

0.1512

0.2342

-0.1677

-0.0395

0.0636

0.0392

0.0590

0.4707

0.3915

0.4092

0.1779

0.2244

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

Mean
Std.Dev.

Japan

U.S.
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IV. Discussion
The differences in dividend payout ratios in the countries may be a
reflection of different institutional structures, economic or tax factors. Germany
and Japan are often reported as having ownership structures that are
concentrated in the hands of a few establishments, mostly banks, if ownership
structure affects the amount of dividends paid, one would expect that Germany
and Japan should have similar dividend payout ratios. The results in this
section are not consistent with this point of view. Germany has a high dividend
payout ratio while Japan has a relatively low dividend payout ratio. France has
the lowest dividend payout ratio followed by Japan. The Japanese low dividend
payout ratio has been attributed to the emphasis on long term growth by firms.
The low dividend yields observed for the Japanese and U.S. firms are
consistent with Michel and Shaked (1986). The low growth rates observed in
Japan and U.S may be a reflection of the fact that firms in these countries are
slow in adjusting their dividend payments to changes in earnings.
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Chapter 5

EFFECTS OF TAX LAW CHANGES ON DIVIDEND PAYOUT RATIOS

I. Introduction
Taxation is an important factor in most financing and investment
decisions. Most recent tax law changes have reduced both corporate and
personal tax rates. These reductions result in more cash flow to firms but do
not necessarily translate to payment of more dividends. The pre and post tax
law payout ratios in the five countries under study are examined to assess the
impact of the tax law changes on dividend payout ratios.

II. Hypotheses
The effective tax rates of investors in all tax brackets and the relative
changes in effective tax rates on dividend income and capital gains are used to
formulate the theoretical effects of tax law changes on dividend payout ratios.
These relative changes in effective tax rates are shown in Tables 8 and 9 and
the effective tax rates for all tax brackets were given in Table 5 (Chapter 3).
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Table 8:

Summary of Changes In Effective Tax Rates for Individuals in
the Highest Tax Brackets

Panel A:

The Percentage Change in Effective Tax Rates
for Dividend Payments

Country

Before the tax
Law Change

After the Tax
Law Change

Percentage
Change

Australia

78.40%

49.00%

-37.50%

France

68.43%

63.37%

-7.39%

Germany

56.00%

53.00%

-5.36%

Japan

67.36%

56.25%

-16.50%

U.S.

73.00%

54.46%

-25.40%

Panel B:

The Percentage Change in Effective Tax Rates
for Unrealized Capital Gains

Country

Before the Tax
Law Change

After the Tax
Law Change

Australia

46.00%

49.00%

6.12%

France

50.00%

34.00%

-32.00%

Germany

56.00%

50.00%

-10.71%

Japan

42.00%

37.50%

-10.71%

U.S.

46.00%

34.00%

-26.09%

Percentage
Change
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Table 9:

Summary of Changes in Effective Tax Rates for
Individuals in Ail the Tax Brackets

Tax Bracket

Percentage in Dividend
Income Rates

Percentage Change in Unrealized
Capital Gains Rates

Australia
20.0%

-13.73%

6.52%

38.0%

-26.34%

6.52%

46.0%

-30.83%

6.52%

48.3%

-32.02%

6.52%

60.0%

-37.50%

6.52%

France
5%

-39.65%

-32.0%

24%

-21.21%

•32.0%

29%

-18.22%

-32.0%

49%

-9.91%

-32.0%

57.9%

-7.39%

-32.0%

Germany
19.2%

0%

-10.71%

29.6%

0%

-10.71%

36.9%

0%

-10.71%

51.5%

0%

-10.71%

53.0%

0%

-10.71%

56.0%

-5.36%

-10.71%
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Table 9 Continued

Tax Bracket

Percentage in Dividend
Income

Percentage Change in Unrealized
Capital Gains Rates

Japan
20%

11.09%

-10.71%

30.5%

8.53%

-10.71%

35.0%

7.97%

-10.71%

57.0%

-10.71%

-16.0%
U.S.

28%

-18.85%

-26.09%

28%

-14.14%

-26.09%

31%

-13.20%

-26.09%

50%

-25.40%

-26.09%
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A.

Australia
In Australia, the calculation of effective tax rates tor investors shown in

Table 5 indicates that investors in all tax brackets were better off with unrealized
capital gains before the tax law change. After the tax law change, all investors
became indifferent to dividend income and unrealized capital gains. This means
that the tax law change eliminated the tax advantage that the unrealized capital
gains option had over the dividend income option. The tax law change
therefore favored the dividend income option.
The decline in effective tax rates for dividend income and unrealized
capital gains are calculated for all tax brackets and is shown in Table 9. The
result shows that the decline in effective tax rates on dividend income is higher
than that on unrealized capital gains for investors in all tax brackets. For
example, the total effective tax rate on dividend income for individuals in the top
tax bracket before the tax law change was 78.4%. This declined to 49% after
the tax law change which represents a 37.5% decrease in the effective tax rate.
The effective tax rate on unrealized capital gains for individuals in the top tax
bracket increased from 46% to 49% after the tax law change, a 6.12% increase
in rates. This is another indication that the tax law change favored the payment
of more dividends8. The dividend payout ratio in Australia is therefore

8lf taxes exclusively influence dividend policy the calculations show that no
dividends should be paid in Australia, France, Japan and U.S. because it is optimal to
always realize capital gains. However, we know that firms do pay dividends.
Therefore the effects of these tax law changes on payout ratios are examined in light
of whether the tax law changes favor the payment of more or less dividends.
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expected to increase after the tax law change.
However, there were reports of tax evasion in Australia before the tax law
change and this was one of the reasons the government embarked on the 1985
tax reform. Partington (1987) also reports that:
In Australia, approximately 70% of dividends have been received tax free
in the hands of the initial recipients, and it is therefore possible that
managers might perceive a tax induced preference for higher payouts
rather than lower payouts.
This suggests that there were loopholes in the Australian tax system that
enabled investors to shield their dividend income from taxation. This implies
that the high effective tax rates on dividend income before the tax law change
may not be meaningful. A correct hypothesis might therefore accommodate the
assumption that investors did not pay taxes on dividend income and capital
gains. A recalculation of the effective tax rates before the tax law change
shows that investors were indifferent to dividend income or capital gains9. With
this assumption, the expected increase in dividend payout ratios may not
materialize. The pre and post tax law dividend payout ratios should not be
significantly different There have been no reports of tax evasions after the tax
law change.

9lf income taxes on dividends are not paid, the total effective tax rate on dividend
income will be T, which is the tax paid at the corporate level.
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B.

France
In France, the effective tax rates show that investors in the 5%, 24% and

29% tax brackets preferred dividend income before the tax law change. After
the tax law change, only investors in the 5% and 24% tax brackets were still
better off with dividend income10. H ie tax law change therefore provided
enough incentive for investors in the 29% bracket to change their preference
from dividend income to unrealized capital gains. This implies that the tax law
change favored capital gains.
A comparison of the changes in effective tax rates on dividend income
and unrealized capital gains (Table 9) also shows that the decline in the
effective tax rate on unrealized capital gains is higher than that on dividend
income for investors in all tax brackets except for the lowest For example, the
effective tax rate on dividend income for individuals in the top tax bracket
declined from 68.43% to 63.37% after the tax law change, a 7.39% decrease.
The unrealized capital gains tax rate for individuals in the top tax bracket
declined from 50% to 34%, a relative change of 32%. These relative changes in
effective tax rates support the conclusion that the tax law change favored capital
gains. The dividend payout ratios in France are therefore expected to decrease
after the tax law change.

10We are assuming that number of investors in the various tax brackets are roughly
the same before and after the tax law change.
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C.

Germany
In Germany, the effective tax rates show that investors in the five tax

brackets were better off with dividend income before the tax law change. After
the tax law change, investors in only three tax brackets were still better off with
dividend income. Investors in the remaining two tax brackets preferred capital
gains. This suggests that the tax law change in Germany favored capital gains.
In addition, the effective tax rates on unrealized capital gains declined for
all investors but the rates on dividend income remained the same for most
investors as shown in Table 9. It is only in the top tax bracket that the effective
tax rate on dividend income declined by 5.36% for some investors compared to
the 10.71% decline on unrealized capital gains option.

This suggests that the

tax law change favored capital gains and is consistent with the earlier
conclusion. A decline in dividend payout ratios is therefore expected in
Germany after the tax law change.

D.

Japan
In Japan, the effective tax rates of investors show that investors in all tax

brackets were better off with unrealized capital gains before and after the tax
law change. It is not possible to predict the direction of change in dividend
payout ratios from this information alone.
The calculation of the changes in effective tax rates shows that the
effective tax rates on unrealized capital gains declined for all investors. On the
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other hand, the effective tax rates on dividend income increased for investors in
three tax brackets while it decreased for some investors in the top tax bracket
It appears therefore that the tax law change in Japan generally favored the
capital gains option. Dividend payout ratios in Japan are therefore expected to
decrease after the tax law change.

E.

United States
Investors in all tax brackets in U.S. preferred unrealized capital gains to

dividend income before and after the tax law change. As in the case of Japan,
it is not possible to predict the direction of change in dividend payout ratios
from this information alone.
The changes in effective tax rates for dividend income and unrealized
capital gains show that the decline in effective tax rates for unrealized capital
gains are slightly higher than that on dividend income for most investors except
in the top tax bracket where the decline in both options are similar. This
suggests that the tax law change in general favored the unrealized capital gains
option. The dividend payout ratios in U.S. is therefore expected to decrease
after the tax law change.
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III.

Methodology

The effect of tax law changes on dividend payout ratios is evaluated by
comparing the pre and post law means. The pared t-test, the Sign test (S-test)
and the Wilcoxon signed rank test (W-test) are used to test for any significant
difference between the pre and post-tax law payout ratios.
The paired t-test compares the pre and post tax law means using the
assumption that the ratios are normally distributed. The W-test and the S-test
are nonparametric alternatives to the t-test which are less sensitive to the
normality assumption. In particular, these tests can be more powerful than the
t-test if outliers are present in the data Such outliers seem to be present in the
Australian and French data The paired t-test tests the null hypothesis that the
difference between the "pre" and "post" test means is significantly different from
zero. The S-test tests the hypothesis that the frequencies of dividend increases
and decreases before and after the tax law change in each country are similar.
The W-test tests the hypothesis that the distributions of the pre and post tax law
payout ratios are identical. If the normality assumption is reasonably valid,
results of the three tests should not be dramatically different A one-tailed test
is used for all the countries because the dividend payout ratios are predicted to
move in a certain direction after the tax law change.
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IV. Results

Tests of the difference between the pre and post tax law dividend payout
ratios along with their p-values are reported in Table 9. The p-values show the
significance level of the test. The pre and post law dividend payout ratios in
Australia are 48.56% and 56.06% respectively. The paired t-test indicates that
this increase in payout ratio is marginally significant at the 11% level. The Wtest and S-test show that there is no significant difference between the pre and
post law payout ratios.
The pre-law dividend payout ratio for France is 27.06% and the post-law
ratio is 22.77%. The paired t-test indicates that there is a significant decline in
dividend payout ratios after the tax law change. The S-test and the W-test
show that there is no significant difference between these two means.
The pre-law mean for Germany is 51.42% and the post-law mean is
50.08% while the pre and post law means for U.S. are 31.33% and 31.60%
respectively. Each of the three tests indicate there are no significant differences
in payout ratios after the tax law changes in these two countries..
The Japanese pre and post law payout ratios are 33.94% and 31.89%
respectively. All three tests show that the two means are significantly different
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Table 10:

Country

The Pre and Post Tax Law Means of Dividend Payout Ratios

Pre-Tax Law
Change Means

Post-Tax Law
Change Means

Paired*
T-Test

S-Test* W-Test*

Australia

0.4856

0.5606

0.11

0.74

0.28

France

0.2706

0.2277

0.03**

0.35

0.25

Germany

0.5142

0.5008

0.63

0.73

0.68

Japan

0.3394

0.3189

0.04**

0.00**

0.00**

U.S.

0.3133

0.3160

0.39

0.14

0.15

....

*The numbers reported are the p-values.
**Denotes significance at the 5% level.
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V. Interpretation of the Results

Two predictions are made on the effect of the Australian tax law change
on dividend payout ratios. One prediction is that dividend payout ratio should
increase after the tax law change. The other is that both means should not be
significantly different The later prediction is based on the fact that there was
widespread evasion of taxes before the tax law change.
The result of the paired t-test shows that the increase in the dividend
payout ratios is marginally significant at the 11% level. However, the results of
the W-test and the S-test show that there is no significant difference between
the two means. An examination of the data shows that the marginal
significance found by the paired t-test is driven by one outlier, if the data for
that firm is removed, the three "mean difference" tests will find an insignificant
difference between the pre and post law ratios. It may therefore be more
appropriate to conclude that there is no significant difference between the pre
and post law payout ratios. The Australian firms maintained about the same
average payout ratios before and after the tax law change. The high effective
rate on dividend income before the tax law change was irrelevant because
investors avoided the taxes on dividends.
In France, the result of the paired t-test suggests that the dividend
payout ratios decreased after the tax law change. The tax law change appears
to have led to the retention of more corporate earnings by French firms. This
was expected because one of the reasons given by the French government for
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introducing the spilt-rate system was to boost investment by encouraging
retention of corporate earnings.
However, the S-test and the W-test show that there is no significant
difference between the pre and post law payout ratios. This contradicts the
result of the paired t-test An examination of the distribution of the dividend
payout ratios shows that there is a skewness in the data The distribution is
skewed to the left which implies that the decline in ratios is due to some firms
who had deep cuts in dividend payouts after the tax law change. This makes it
difficult to make any general statement about the effect of the tax law change
on dividend payout ratios in France.
There is no significant difference between the pre-law and post-law
payout ratios in Germany and U.S. This conclusion is supported by the three
tests. It is predicted that the dividend payout ratios in Germany and U.S.
shouM decline after the tax law change but these results suggest that the tax
law change in both countries did not have any significant impact on dividend
payout ratios. Firms and investors did not think that the relative changes in
both options were significant enough to affect their preference for dividend
income or capital gains. The U.S. result is consistent with Abruntyn and Turner
(1990) and Bolster and Janjigian (1991) that find no significant difference
between the pre and post law dividend ratios in U.S. but contradicts Gordon
and Mackie-Mason (1990) that found a significant increase in dividend payout
ratios in U.S. after the tax law change.
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H ie results of the three "mean difference tests" indicate that there is a
significant decline in dividend payout ratios in Japan after the tax law change. It
can therefore be concluded that the tax law change significantly decreased the
dividend payout ratios in Japan because it favored the payment of less
dividends.
The trends in the dividend payout ratios in the five countries are shown in
Figures 1 through 5 as a visual aid. There appears to be significant movement
in payout ratios in the year of the change in Australia and France. There was a
sharp increase in Australia and a sharp decline in France even though there
was a fairly stable trend before the tax law change.
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Figure 1:

Yearly Dividend Payout Ratios in Australia
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Figure 2:

Yearly Dividend Payout Ratios in France
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Figure 3:

Yearly Dividend Payout Ratios in Germany
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Figure 4:

Yearly Dividend Payout Ratios in Japan

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

37
YEAR OF CHANGE

36<o

£
tr

35-

|

34-

S
z
LU
9

S3'

> 32Q

3130

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

T

1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
YEARS

71

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Figure 5:

Yearly Dividend Payout Ratios in United States
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VI. Adjustment of the Dividend Payout Ratios for Macro
Economic Variables
It is possible that dividend payout ratios are influenced by macro
economic variables. There is no documentation of any study, to my
knowledge, that has adjusted the dividend payout ratios for macro economic
effects. I selected and examined variables that are likely to influence dividend
payouts. These variables are interest rates, gross national product (GNP) and
growth rate of GNP. If it is established that these variables affect dividend
payout ratios, they can be used as covariates to obtain the adjusted means for
the payout ratios. In order to do this, there has to be a consistent relationship
between dividend payout ratios and the covariates. These relationships are
examined by regressing dividend payout ratios on each of the proposed
covariates. The regressions show that there is no significant relationship
between dividend payout ratios and GNP or GNP growth in all the countries.
There is a weak negative relationship between dividend payout ratios and
interest rates (the higher the interest rates the lower the dividend payout ratios).
A possible explanation of the observed negative relationship is that during
periods of high interest rates, it becomes cheaper for firms to use internal
financing. Firms therefore conserve their cash flow for further investment by
retaining larger proportions of earnings. This results in low dividend payout
ratios.
Therefore interest rates are used as a covariate to adjust for macro

73

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

economic effects using covariance analysis (the results of the adjusted means
are given in Table 10). A t-test shows that the changes in dividend payout
ratios for Germany and U.S. are insignificant while the changes in payout ratios
for Australia and France and Japan are significant The dividend payout ratio
for Australia increased from 48.56% to 56.63%. There was a decrease in the
dividend payout ratio in France from a pre-law mean of 27.08% to post-law of
22.75%. Germany’s dividend payout ratio changed from a pre-law average of
50.59% to a post-law average of 52.96%, while Japan’s ratio changed from a
pre-law of 34.15% to a post-law of 32.14%. The pre and post tax law dividend
payout ratios for U.S. are 31.64% and 31.35% respectively. The unadjusted
means shown in Table 9 are very similar to the adjusted means. This implies
that dividend payout ratios are not affected very much by interest rates in the
five countries.
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Table 11:

I

Country

The Adjusted Pre and Post Tax Law Means of Dividend
Payout Ratios

Pre-Tax Law Mean

Post-Tax Law Mean

Australia

0.4856

0.5663

France

0.2708

0.2275

Germany

0.5059

0.5296

Japan

0.3415

0.3214

U.S.

0.3164

0.3135
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The dividend payout ratios in the years before the tax law changes are
also examined for any lag effects. Talmor and Titman (1990) suggest that
investors’ preference for cash dividends or deferred income may be influenced
by future changes in tax laws. Investors who would normally realize capital
gains may decide to receive immediate dividend income rather than realize
future capital gains that may be taxed at a higher rate due to an announced or
anticipated tax law change and vice versa. It is therefore important that any
possibility of such lag effects be examined. This is achieved by comparing the
dividend payout ratios in the year that the announcement of a tax law change
was made to the mean of the pre-announcement payout ratios. If there is a lag
effect there should be a significant change in the year that the tax law change
was announced. This means that most of the effect of the tax law change will
take place in the announcement year rather than the year the tax law change
actually took effect The tax law change in Australia was announced in 1985
and became effective in 1987. The tax law change in France was announced in
1987. Germany and Japan’s tax law changes were announced in 1988. The
content of the Tax reform Act in U.S. was announced in 1986. No significant
lag effects are found for any country.
Khoury and Smith (1977) claim that changes in tax laws can be captured
by dividend growth rates. Tax law changes that reduced the tax disadvantage
of dividend income should lead to increases in dividend growth rates while tax
law changes that increased the tax disadvantage of dividend income should
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lead to decreases in dividend growth rates. Dividend growth rates are therefore
examined to see the direction of the growth rates. Khoury and Smith’s claim
suggests that the dividend growth rates in France, Germany, Japan and U.S
should decrease after the tax law. The Australian dividend growth rates should
increase if we assume that the dividend taxes are paid, otherwise the dividend
growth rates should remain the same.
The results show that there are insignificant change in dividend growth
rates for Australia, Germany, Japan and U.S. while there is a significant
decrease in the dividend growth rate in France. The dividend growth rate in
France declined by more than 50% in the year of the tax law change. The
French result is consistent with the prediction. The Australian result is also
consistent with the prediction that assumes investors did not pay taxes on their
income before the tax law change. The pre and post tax law dividend growth
rates are shown in Table 11.
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Table 12: The Pre and post Tax Law Means of the Dividend Growth Rates

Country

Pre-Tax Law
Change Mean

Post-Tax Law Paired*
Change Mean T-Test

S-Test

W-Test

Australia

0.1135

0.1441

0.19

0.31

France

0.1301

0.0655

0.09**

0.01**

0.00**

Germany

0.0716

0.0738

0.48

0.22

0.17

Japan

0.0508

0.0552

0.32

0.37

0.11

U.S.

0.0569

0.0574

0.48

0.21

0.16

0.35

*The numbers reported are the p-values.
**Denotes significance at 5% level.
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VII.

Summary

The contradictory results of the "means difference" tests make it difficult
to draw any conclusions on the effect of tax law changes on dividend payout
ratios. The Australian result is consistent with the prediction that assumes that
investors avoided paying taxes before the tax law change. The direction of the
change in dividend payout ratios for France is consistent with the prediction but
the significance of the change is not confirmed by all three "means difference"
tests. The paired t-test finds the change significant while the non-parametric
tests find it insignificant The changes in dividend payout ratios in Germany and
U.S. are insignificant and inconsistent with the predictions. Japan’s result is
consistent with the predictions and the three "means difference" confirm the
significance of the results. Dividend payout ratios declined in Japan after the
tax law change. The results in this section are therefore inconclusive and no
general inference can be made on the effect of tax law changes on dividend
payout ratios.

79

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 6

TAX EFFECTS HYPOTHESIS ON THE VALUE OF A FIRM

I. Introduction
Some authors believe that dividend policy affects the value of a firm
because of tax effects. The tax effects hypothesis says that dividends have a
negative effect on the value of a firm. In countries where capital gains are taxed
at a lower rate than dividend income, firms that pay large dividends are
expected to offer higher returns to compensate for the higher taxes paid on
dividends. These firms therefore should have lower stock prices and firm
values. The tax effects hypothesis therefore implies that the relationship
between expected return and dividend yield should be positive in countries
where dividend income is taxed at a higher rate than capital gains and negative
in countries where capital gains are taxed at a higher rate than dividend income.
The predictions made in the next section should hold if the tax effects
hypothesis is valid.
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II.

Hypotheses

The tax calculations in Chapter 3 show that investors in all tax brackets in
Japan and U.S. preferred unrealized capital gains to dividend income before
and after the tax law changes. If the tax hypothesis is correct, we should
expect to see a positive relationship between expected return and dividend yield
in these countries before and after the tax law change.
The Australian tax calculations show that investors in all tax brackets
preferred unrealized capital gains to dividend income before the tax law change
if dividend taxes were paid but indifferent to both options if dividend taxes were
not paid. This implies that there may be a positive or insignificant relationship
between expected return and dividend yield before the tax law change. After
the tax law change, investors in all tax brackets were indifferent to the dividend
income and unrealized capital gains options. An insignificant relationship
between expected return and dividend yield is therefore expected after the tax
law change.
In France and Germany, some investors preferred dividend income while
others preferred capital gains before and after the tax law change. This
suggests that the relationship between expected return and dividend yield is
ambiguous. The marginal investors will determine foe relationship between foe
two variables. There should be a positive relationship between expected return
and dividend yield if foe marginal investors’ effective tax rate on dividend
income is higher than that on capital gains while there should be a negative
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relationship if the marginal investors’ effective tax rate on dividend income is
lower than that on capital gains.
The coefficient of the dividend yield in the CAPM (discussed in the next
section) is defined as the marginal effective tax difference between ordinary
income and capital gains. If the tax law change increased the relative tax
disadvantage associated with dividend income, the marginal tax difference
between dividend income and capital gains should also increase. This change
is expected because investors should demand a higher expected return to
compensate for the higher tax difference between dividend income and capital
gains. The dividend yield coefficient should therefore increase. Conversely, if
the tax law change reduced the relative tax disadvantage of dividend income,
the marginal tax difference should decrease and the dividend yield coefficient is
expected to decrease.
In Australia, the expected change of the dividend yield coefficient
depends on whether dividend income taxes were paid before the tax law
change. If taxes were paid on dividend income, the tax calculations showed
that the tax law change reduced the tax disadvantage of dividend income. This
leads to the prediction that the coefficient on the dividend yield should decrease
after the tax law change. However, if dividend income taxes were not paid,
there should be an insignificant change in the dividend yield coefficient
The tax calculations indicate that the tax law change increased the tax
disadvantage of dividend income relative to capital gains for all investors in

82

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

France (except for investors in the lowest tax bracket) and Germany, it is
therefore predicted that the dividend yield coefficient should increase after the
tax law change in France and Germany.
The tax calculations also suggest that the tax law change increased the
tax disadvantage of dividend income relative to capital gains for most investors
in Japan and U.S. The dividend yield coefficient is therefore expected to
increase in these countries after the tax law change.

III. Methodology
The use of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) in testing the
relationship between dividend yield and expected return has become a standard
practice. Brennan (1970), Black and Scholes (1974), Miller and Scholes (1982),
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979 and 1982) used the CAPM to test this
relationship.
The CAPM is an equilibrium asset pricing model that tries to establish a
consistent relationship between risk and expected return. Securities that have
high risk are expected to provide higher rates of return while those with low risk
are expected to provide lower rates of return. The relevant risk in pricing
securities is the systematic risk (market related risk) which cannot be diversified
away. This model uses beta (B) to measure the systematic risk of a security.
Beta is defined as the covariance between the asset return and the market
return divided by the variance of the market return. The CAPM says that the
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required rate of return on any security is a linear function of the beta of that
security. The CAPM is usually expressed as:
*< *!.*> = &e.t +

4

where E(R, t) is the expected return on security i in period t,
R,t is the short term risk-free rate in period t,
/3,t is the beta for security i in period t and
E(Rmt) is the expected return on the market portfolio in period t
Brennan (1970) extended the CAPM to incorporate the effects of
personal taxes paid on dividends. His after-tax CAPM states that the expected
return of a security is a function of the security's risk characteristics (beta) and
its expected dividend yield. Brennan’s after-tax CAPM is given as follows:
Rl . t ~ Re, e = 3^COV{Rl t t , Ra>e)

(DYit t ~ Rf t t ) .....................................5

where R,t is the rate of return on the ith security in period t,
R,t is the return on a risk-free asset in period t,
a1 is the marginal effect of risk in period t,
COV(Rl t,Rmt) is the covariance of the security’s return with the
market’s return in period t,
3^

is the marginal effective tax difference between ordinary income and

capital gains rate and
DY, t is the dividend yield in period t
His interpretation of this model is that for a given level of risk, investors
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require higher returns from securities that pay large dividends to compensate
for the differential tax treatment between dividend income and capital gains.
The general after-tax CAPM equation used to test the relationship
between the value of a firm and dividend policy is given as:
*i.e " Rt . t = a0 +

" Rf . J

+

+ ci . t ...............................................6

where R,t is the before-tax return on the ith security in period t,
Rjt is the return on the risk-free asset in period t,
a„ is the constant term,
a, is the marginal effect of risk,
B,t is the systematic risk of the ith security in period t,
% is the marginal effective tax difference between ordinary income and
capital gains rate,
DY,t is the dividend yield in period t and
eit is the error term in period t
A complete derivation of this model is given in Brennan (1970) and Litzenberger
and Ramaswamy (1979). The major assumptions that underlie the derivation of
the model as detailed by Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) are:
1.

Investors are rational and risk averse and therefore maximize utility in a
mean variance domain.

2.

Security rates of return have a multivariate normal distribution.

3.

Investors have homogenous expectations. This implies that investors
have identical expectations in terms of expected return and variance
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because they have the same information about ail securities.
4.

Transaction costs are insignificant

5.

There are no restrictions on short sales of securities. Investors can sell
securities they do not own and use the proceeds to buy other securities.

6.

Individuals are price takers. An individual’s buying or selling action
cannot affect the price of a stock.

7.

All assets are marketable which implies that all assets, including human
capital, can be bought and sold.

8.

A riskless asset paying a constant rate exists. An investor can lend or
borrow an unlimited amount of funds at the risk-free rate.

9.

Dividends on securities are paid at the end of the period.

10.

Income taxes are progressive and the marginal tax rate is a continuous
function of taxable income.

11.

There are no taxes on capital gains. This assumption is based on the
fact that capital gains taxes are only paid if realized.

Some of these assumptions do not realistically describe the behavior of capital
markets. However, the CAPM still holds if some of the assumptions are
relaxed. Elton and Gruber show that the CAPM is very robust to the violation of
some of the assumptions. They relaxed assumptions 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 and are
able to obtain similar results.
The first step in the CAPM is to estimate the beta of individual securities
for the period of study. This is done by regressing the stock return in excess of

86

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the risk-free rate (R, - Fy on the excess return on the market portfolio
(Rfnt' Rft)- A portfolio of securities that is riskier than the market portfolio is
expected to yield a higher return than the market return while one that is not as
risky as the market portfolio should provide lower returns. The market portfolio
is not observable, so proxies are used. The commonly used proxies are the
New York Stock Exchange Index, the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index, or the
AMEX Index.
The second step is to regress the portfolio’s excess return on the
obtained beta and the difference between the dividend yield and the risk free
rate (DY„ - R„). However, capturing risk with beta has received a lot of criticism
(see Roll 1977). Some of the criticisms are as follows:
1.

The true market portfolio is not observable and cannot be determined to
be efficient or not

2.

Using proxies for the market portfolio may lead to inferences that are not
necessarily true. The validity of the CAPM and the efficiency of the
market portfolio is a joint hypothesis that is difficult to test because the
market portfolio is not observable. If a particular test does not support
the CAPM this may mean that the ex-post portfolio used to estimate beta
is not efficient or that foe predicted linear relationship between beta and
expected return does not hold.

3.

Beta does not explain most of the variation of the returns of securities.
These criticisms led to the search for alternative risk variables. Banz
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(1981) suggests that the unexplained variation of a security’s expected return
can be explained by a size effect Bhandari (1988) concludes that leverage is
important in predicting expected return. Basu (1983) claims that the eamingsprice (E/P) ratio is an important factor in evaluating the variations in expected
returns. Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985) and Chan, Hamao, and
Lakonishok (1991) conclude that the ratio of a firm’s book value of common
equity (BE) to its market value of equity (ME) explains the variation of expected
returns better than beta.
Fama and French (1992) evaluate all the risk variables suggested above.
Their major conclusions are:
1.

The performance of the beta-based regression is poor and unstable over
time.

2.

The size of the firm measured by the market value of equity and the
book-to-market value of equity explain the variation of expected returns
on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ better than beta.

3.

The ratio of book-to-market value of equity had a higher explanatory
power than the size variable.
Based on the above results, a modified version of the after-tax CAPM is

used in this study. The risk variables are size (measured by the market value of
equity) and the ratio of book-to-market value of equity. The market value of
equity is defined as the number of outstanding shares multiplied by the price of
the stock. Market value is a proxy for firm size. The size effect has received
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considerable attention in the literature with the documentation of a negative
relationship between size and returns. Smaller firms offer higher expected
returns than bigger firms. This has been attributed to the feet that smaller firms
are less stable and therefore viewed by investors as being more risky. In order
to attract investors, smaller firms must offer higher expected returns. Therefore
the relationship between size and expected return should be negative.
The other risk variable is foe ratio of book value of equity to market value
of equity (BE/ME). This variable can be used to measure foe performance of
firms. A low (BE/ME) ratio means that foe market value is greater than foe
book value of common equity and is an indication that foe firm is doing well.
On foe other hand, a high ratio means that foe firm’s stock price is low and
may be a sign that foe firm is in distress. Fama and French (1992) suggest that
foe risk captured by foe (BE/ME) ratio may be foe relative distress factor
presented in Chan and Chen (1991). The relationship between this risk variable
and returns is expected to be positive.
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Univariate and multivariate cross sectional regressions are run with the
two risk variables. The models are as follows:
Rl . t - R f . t = *o +

- Rf t t ) + el t t ....................................... 7

e +

BE

Ri . t - R f . t = A> + b i - z r *

+ b z W i . t - R f.t)

* ui#e.........................................8

BE. r

R f . t - R f . t = «o +

+ a 3^DYl . t - R f . t )

+

* *i.t

9

where R,t is the before-tax return on the ith security in period t,
R,t is the return on the risk-free asset in period tr
a,,, b0 and a0 are the constant terms,
av b1t a 1 and a2 are the marginal risk effects,
ME, t is the market value of equity in period t,
BE* is the book value of equity in period t,
a^ b2 and a3 are the marginal effective tax differences between
ordinary income and capital gains rates,
DY, t is the expected dividend yield in period t, and
e,t, u,t and n,t are the error terms.
Annual dividend yields are used in the regressions and they are defined as the
annual dividend per share divided by the stock price at the end of the fiscal
year. The expected dividend yield for year t is the dividend yield of the previous
year. The annual dividend yield has the advantage of ensuring that any price
adjustments, information, or tax accrual effects must have had time to stabilize.
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Jose and Stevens (1989) argue that there is a possibility that tax effects accrue
gradually over a period of time. The use of short run measures (such as the
quarterly dividend yield) may therefore lead to erroneous results that only reflect
short run price adjustments that are not permanent The market value of equity
is the value at the end of the fiscal year.
Cross sectional regressions are run for the pre and post tax law periods
and for the nine-year period in each country using Ordinary Least Squares and
the Maximum Likelihood Estimation. Regressions by Black and Scholes (1974),
Litzenberger, R.H. and K. Ramaswamy (1979,1982), etc., grouped securities
into portfolios in order to reduce the estimation error and the non-stationarity
problems associated with estimated beta. This portfolio grouping is not
necessary in this study since beta is not being used.

V. Results
The results of the regressions for the entire period (1984 -1991) are
given in Table 1211. The relationship between dividend yield and expected
return is positive for France, Germany, Japan and U.S. This relationship is
significant in the three models. Australia is the only country with an insignificant
relationship between dividend yield and expected return. The coefficients of
market value of equity are negative while the coefficients of the ratio of book-to-

11These are Maximum Likelihood Estimation results. There is no significant difference
between these results and the Ordinary Least Squares results.
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market value of equity are positive for all countries. These are the expected
signs and most of the coefficients are significant
The pre and post tax law regression results are shown in Table 13. The
dividend yield coefficients are positive and significant in France, Japan and the
U.S. both before and after the tax law change in the univariate and multivariate
regressions. The relationship between dividend yield and expected return in
Australia is insignificant before and after the tax law change. There is an
insignificant relationship between expected return and dividend yield in Germany
before the tax law change. After the tax law change, this relationship is positive
and significant in the univariate regressions but only significant at the 15% level
in the multivariate regression.
The pre and post tax law regressions results show that the change in
dividend yield coefficient in Japan and U.S. is insignificant in the three
regressions and inconsistent with the prediction. The change in the dividend
yield coefficient for France and Germany is significant12 in all the three
regressions and is consistent with the prediction. The insignificant change in
the coefficient for Australia is also consistent with the prediction that assumes
that there was widespread evasion of taxes before the tax law change. These

12The formula used to test for significance of a change in the dividend yield coefficient
is given as Z = (B2 - B , ) / ^ - s2fl1) where Z is approximately normally distributed
because the number of firms is large in the countries. B2 and B1 are the post and pre
tax law dividend yield coefficients while s2^ and s2B1 are the estimated standard errors.
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results are generally consistent with the predictions about the change in the
dividend yield coefficients.
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Table 13:

Country
Australia

Regressions of Expected Return on Market Value of Equity,
Ratio of Book-to-Market Value of Equity and Dividend Yield
Between 1984 and 1991

Coeff. of DY
-0.18
(-0.46)

Coeff. of ME
-0.08
(-4.05)

0.25
(5.03)

-0.40
(-1.07)

France

-0.32
(•0.86)

-0.05
(-2.43)

6.21
(5.86)

-0.12
(-7.00)

0.21
(3.79)

5.07
(4.72)

Germany

0.24
(6.79)

5.52
(5.16)

-0.09
(-4.12)

3.49
(5.22)

-0.04
(-3.54)

0.15
(3.50)

2.58
(3.71)

Japan

0.15
(4.88)

2.52
(3.66)

-0.04
(-3.15)

8.59
(14.28)

-0.06
(-6.86)

0.14
(4.60)

8.11
(13.16)
7.64
(12.31)

Coeff. of BE/ME

0.13
(7.36)
-0.04
(-5.00)

0.10
(5.67)
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Table 13 Continued

Country
U.S.

Coeff. of DY
3.19
(2.00)

Coeff. of ME
-0.04
(-1.94)

2.94
(8.22)
3.13
(8.07)

Coeff. of BE/ME

0.03
(1.92)
-0.01
(-1.26)

0.02
(1-15)

I

T-statistics in parentheses

Coeff. of DY is the coefficient of dividend yield.
Coeff. of ME is the coefficient of market value of equity.
Coeff. of BE/ME is the coefficient of the ratio of book-to-market value of equity.
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TABLE 14: Pre and Post Tax Law Regressions of Expected Return on
Market Value of Equity, Ratio of Book-to-Market Value of
Equity and Dividend Yield (1984*1991)
Country

Pre-Tax Law Period
DY

Australia

-0.12
(-0.12)

ME

-0.48
(-0.47)

-0.10
(-2.55)

4.80
(3.06)

-0.12
(-4.68)

4.10
(2.61)

Germany

4.54
(2.89)

-0.08
(-2.41)

-0.48
(-0.43)

-0.03
(-2.45)

-1.92
(-1.34)

Japan

-1.74
(-1.37)

-0.02
(-1.79)

4.51
(4.37)

-0.04
(-3.38)

3.73
(3.59)
3.86
(3.71)

BE/ME

-0.11
(-2.87)

0.31
(0.36)

France

Post-Tax Law Period

-0.02
(-1.86)

DY

ME

-0.12
(-0.28)

-0.04
(-1.47)
0.24
(3.25)

0.19
(1.92)

-0.38
(-0.88)

0.14
(1.42)

-0.35
(-0.80)

-0.03
(-0.86)

6.88
(6.22)

-0.03
(-1.49)

0.24
(4.94)

6.21
(5.36)

0.15
(2.57)

6.39
(5.50)

-0.03
(-1.54)

2.87
(2.09)

-0.02
(-0.95)

0.18
(4.89)

2.28
(1.51)

-0.02
(-0.94)

2.51
(4.21)

-0.10
(-7.86)

0.09
(3.96)

3.51
(5.43)

0.02
(0.34)

0.04
(0.98)

1.97
(1.73)

1.32
(5.73)

0.22
(3.00)

0.04
(0.77)

0.19
(5.19)

0.11
(4.87)

BE/ME

0.04
(0.97)

0.17
(6.45)
-0.09
(-7.70)

0.16
(6.26)
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Table 14 Continued

| Country

Pre-Tax Law Period
DY

U.S.

5.03
(1.23)

ME
-0.10
(-1.71)

4.16
(9.33)
4.47
(9.24)

BE/ME

-0.01
(-1.64)

Post-Tax Law Period
DY

ME

2.71
(5.08)

-0.01
(-1.70)

-0.05
(-2.84)

2.27
(4.35)

-0.06
(-3.20)

2.30
(4.09)

BE/ME

0.06
(3.28)
■0.001
(-0.12)

0.06
(2.74)

T-statistics in parentheses

DY is the coefficient of dividend yield.
ME is the coefficient of market value of equity.
BE/ME is the coefficient of the ratio of book-to-market value of equity.
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IV. Interpretation of Results

The results show that there is a positive and significant relationship
between expected return and dividend yield in France, Germany, Japan and
U.S. for the whole period. These results imply that stocks that pay high
dividends generally have low stock prices. This is consistent with the tax effects
hypothesis. The Australian cross sectional regression reveals an insignificant
relationship between expected return and dividend yield. The Australian
investors expect comparable returns from stocks that pay high or low
dividends.
The focus of this study is on the relationship between expected returns
and dividend yield before and after the tax law change. The results show that
there is an insignificant relationship between expected return and dividend yield
before and after the tax law change in Australia The insignificant relation
between expected return before the tax law change is consistent with the
prediction that assumes taxes on dividend income were not paid before the tax
law change. This insignificant relationship suggests that the high tax rate on
dividend income was of no consequence since these taxes were not paid. The
insignificant relationship after the tax law change is expected and is consistent
with the tax effects hypothesis.
The positive and significant dividend yield coefficients obtained for Japan
and U.S. before and after the tax law change is also consistent with the
predictions of the tax effects hypothesis. These results suggest that investors
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demand higher returns from stocks that pay high dividends. This also implies
that dividends have a negative effect on the value of a firm.
The positive relationship found between expected return and dividend
yield in France and Germany supports the tax effects hypothesis and also
suggests that marginal investors may be in the higher tax brackets. The tax
calculations show that the relationship between expected return and dividend
yield in France and Germany is ambiguous because some investors preferred
dividend income while others preferred capital gains. Investors in the lower tax
brackets were better off with dividend income than capital gains while investors
in the higher tax brackets were better off with capital gains in France before and
after the tax law change. If the marginal investors are in lower tax brackets, the
relationship between expected return and dividend yield should have been
negative. But the results reveal a positive relationship between the two
variables before and after the tax law change which implies that the marginal
investor may be in the higher tax brackets. In Germany, the relationship
between expected return before the tax law change should be insignificant if the
marginal investor is in the top tax bracket because the effective tax rate on
dividend income and capital gains are the same in this tax bracket However,
the relationship between the two variables should be positive after the tax law
change, if the marginal investor is in the higher tax brackets. The results show
that the relationship expected return and dividend yield is insignificant before the
tax law change and positive and significant at the 15% level after the tax law
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change.
It is also interesting to observe that there is a shift in the dividend yield
coefficients after the tax law change. In France and Germany, there is a
significant increase in the coefficient of dividend yield and these are two of the
four countries that increased the tax disadvantage associated with dividend
income after the tax law change. The change in the dividend yield coefficient
for Australia is insignificant This is the country where the tax law change did
not significantly change the tax position of investors if it is assumed that taxes
were not paid. The changes in the dividend yield coefficient for Japan and U.S
are insignificant and are inconsistent with the predictions.
The results of the changes in the dividend yield coefficients are also
consistent with Poterba and Summers (1984) that conclude that the 1973
change in dividend taxation in Britain had a substantial effect on the premium
required by investors on firms that paid high dividends. Investors demanded a
higher expected return after a tax law change that increased the tax
disadvantage of dividend income was introduced. Ang, Blackwell and
Megginson (1991) also report that in Britain, stocks sold at a premium before
the tax law change when the tax law favored capital gains. However, the same
stocks sold at a discount when a tax law change that reduced the tax
advantage of capital gains was introduced.
The coefficients of market value of equity and the ratio of book-to-market
value of equity have the expected signs in a!! the countries. Market value of
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equity has a negative and significant relationship with expected return and this
is consistent with the results of Fama and French (1992). Smaller firms are
perceived to be risky and therefore generally have higher expected returns.
The coefficients of the ratio of book-to-market value of equity are positive and
significant Firms that have low (BE/ME) ratios provide lower expected returns
because they are perceived to be doing well. Firms that have high (BE/ME)
ratios, on the other hand, are perceived as distressed firms and need to offer
higher returns to attract investors. These two risk variables are significant in
explaining the expected return on stocks with the ratio of (BE/ME) generally
having a higher explanatory power.

V.

Summary
The results of this section provide evidence in support of the tax effects

hypothesis. The relationship between expected return and dividend yield is
positive and significant in France, Japan and U.S. These are countries that tax
dividend income at a higher rate than capital gains. On the other hand, the
relationship between expected return and dividend yield is insignificant in
Australia and Germany (before the tax law change). Investors in these
countries were indifferent to the dividend income and unrealized capital gains
options because the two options were taxed at the same rate. The conclusion
is further strengthened by the results of the changes in the coefficient of
dividend yield. Trie dividend yield coefficient increased in France and Germany
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which are two of the four countries that increased the tax disadvantage of
dividend income. The change in the yield coefficient in Australia is insignificant
and this is the expected result because the tax law change did not change the
tax position of investors. The results also suggest that the marginal investors
may be in the top tax brackets.
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CHAPTER 7

UNTNER’S PARTIAL ADJUSTMENT MODEL

I. Introduction
Lintner (1956) derives a dividend behavioral model that is used to
describe the dividend behavior of U.S. firms. The last part of this work
evaluates how well Lintner’s partial adjustment model describes the dividend
behavior of firms in other countries.

II. Methodology
Lintner (1956) examines the variables that influence the dividend
policies of firms. His findings indicate that firms have long term target dividend
payout ratios; the dividend change from year to year is more important than the
absolute amount of dividends paid in a given year; and that managers are
reluctant to make dividend changes that may have to be reversed within a short
period. Lintner used these findings to develop a partial adjustment model.
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Limner’s model is given as:
i . t = & i + C t l D l t - Dl t t ^ )

+ ui t t ..............................................................................10

where *D i t is the change in dividends for firm i in period t,
c, is the speed of adjustment to the difference between a target
dividend payout and last year’s payout,
D* t is the target dividend payout in period t,
D,M is last period’s dividend payout in period t-1,
a, is the constant term and
u, t is a normally distributed random error.

=

X i.J i.t ................................................................................................................................................................................. 11

where r, t is the desired payout ratio in period t and
y, t is the current earnings.
This equation says that the amount of dividends paid in a given year is a
proportion of the earnings for that year. This implies that firms adjust partially to
changes in earnings while determining the amount of dividends to be paid.
Equation 10 can be written as:
A ^ i.t =

* CiZiYi.t ~ cPi.t-x

+

* i.t ...............................................................12

The actual regression used by Lintner is
D i . t = *>i *

~ * A .e -i + ui . t ....................................................................................13
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From equation (13) the partial adjustment coefficient (speed of
adjustment) and the long-run payout ratios can be calculated. The partial
adjustment coefficient reflects how test a firm adjusts its dividend payment
toward the target ratio. The partial adjustment coefficient and long run payout
ratio are as follows:
The partial adjustment coefficient = 1 - b213
The long run payout ratio

= b,/(1 - b^.

Estimation intervals are obtained for the speed of adjustment These intervals
are used to calculate a range for the calculated payout ratios to account for
estimation errors.
Nakamura and Nakamura (1989) claim that the addition of a size variable
improves the forecasting ability of Lintner’s model. A size variable measured by
market value of equity is therefore added in Lintner’s partial adjustment as a
second model. This model is given as:
D i.t

= A> + *>i Y i . t - * A . c - i + b 3M E l i t + Ui / £ ..................................................... 1 4

where D,t is the current dividends for firm i in period t,
Y, t is the current earnings for firm i in period t,
DiM is last period’s dividend payout for firm i,
ME,t is the market value of equity for firm i in period t,

% is the coefficient of dividends per share and b1 is the coefficient of earnings per
share.
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b0 is the constant term and

u, t is a normally distributed random error.
Earning per share (EPS) and cash flow per share (CFS) are used in the
two models. The cash flow variable is used to test Brittain’s claim that the use
of cash flow provides a better predictive power than the use of earnings per
share in Lintner’s model.

III. Results
The results of the partial adjustment models for each country are given in
Table 14. Lintner’s model is able to explain 64.86% of the dividend behavior in
Australia, 80.49% in France, 62.81% in Germany, 91.67% in Japan and 88.01%
in U.S. The cash flow model explains 40.61% of the dividend behavior in
Australia, 78.60% in France, 59.53% in Germany, and 88.97% in U.S. The
earnings per share model that incorporates a size variable explains 64.76% of
dividend behavior in Australia, 80.56% in France, 63.52% in Germany, 91.69% in
Japan and 88.85% in U.S., while the cash flow counterpart explains 43.16% in
Australia, 78.83% in France, 60.58% in Germany, and 88.97% in U.S. The cash
flow model was not run in Japan because of a lack of complete data for cash
flows. The reported coefficients of correlation (R2) are the adjusted R2.
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Table 15:

Regressions of the Partial Adjustment Models

COUNTRY INT
Australia

France

Germany

Japan

U.S.

DSLAG1

EPS

CFS

ME

R2

DW

64.86%

2.14

64.76%

2.15

40.61%

2.19

43.16%

2.19

80.49%

1.94

80.56%

1.94

78.60%

1.90

78.83%

1.90

62.81%

2.11

63.52%

2.13

59.53%

2.10

60.58%

2.13

0.01

0.68

0.19

-0.01

0.68

0.19

0.02

0.56

0.099

-0.33

0.54

0.075

1.36

0.92

0.02

-4.36

0.91

0.02

1.14

0.94

0.006

-7.72

0.92

0.001

1.41

0.70

0.07

-2.34

0.68

0.06

1.32

0.75

0.013

-3.27

0.72

0.008

0.51

0.91

0.02

91.67%

1.99

-1.15

0.90

0.02

91.69%

1.99

0.05

0.93

0.01

88.01%

2.02

-0.41

0.87

0.01

88.85%

2.01

0.07

0.99

-0.013

87.71%

2.03

-0.51

0.93

-0.013

88.97%

2.00

0.002

0.028

0.393

0.61

0.294

0.368

-0.013

-0.013

INT Is the Intercept of the regression
DSLAG1 is the lag of dividends per share
EPS is earnings per share
CFS is cash flow per share
ME la the market value of equity
F? is the adjusted coefficient of determination
DW is the Durbin-Wbteon statistics.
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The calculated long term payout ratios and the speed of adjustment for
the five countries are given in Table 15. The speed of adjustments for Australia,
France, Germany, Japan and U.S are 32%, 8%, 30%, 9% and 7% respectively.
The estimation interval for the speed of adjustment is (21%-43%) for Australia;
(7%-23%) for France; (13%-48%) for Germany; (7%-25%) for Japan and (3%11%) for U.S. The calculated long term payout ratios are 59.38% (44%-88%)14
for Australia; 25% (9%-29%) for France; 23% (15%-54%) for Germany; 22.22%
(8%-28%) for Japan and 28.57% (9%-33%) for U.S15.

14The numbers in parentheses are the calculated range for the payout ratios.
15The range for the payout ratios are calculated by dividing the coefficients of the
earnings variable obtained in Lintner’s model by the upper and lower limits obtained for
the estimation interval of the speed of adjustments.
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Table 16:

Coefficients of Partial Adjustment and Speed of Adjustment

Country

b1

b2

Speed of
Adjustment

Long Run
Payout Ratio

Australia

0.19

0.68

32.0%

59.38%

France

0.02

0.92

8.0%

25.00%

Germany

0.07

0.70

30.0%

23.00%

Japan

0.02

0.91

9.0%

22.22%

U.S.

0.01

0.93

7.0%

28.57%

b, is the coefficient of earnings per share
is the coefficient of dividends per share
Speed of adjustment

= 1-

Long run payout ratio - b ,/l • bfe).

109

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

IV. Interpretation of Results

For all countries, the predictive power of the earnings per share models
are slightly higher than those of the cash flow models except in Australia where
the EPS model has a significantly higher R2. This is contrary to Brittain’s results
that conclude that cash flow models have better predictive power than earnings
per share models.
The intercepts in the regressions are positive. This is consistent with
Lintner’s results which show that the intercepts are positive to reflect the fact
that firms are very reluctant to cut dividend payments. The earnings per share
variable and last year’s dividend are the most significant factors in explaining
the dividend policy of firms. The size variable does not add very much to the
explanatory power of the regressions.
The calculated payout ratios for Australia, France and U.S. are not
significantly different from the actual payout ratios but for Germany and Japan,
the calculated payout ratios are lower than the actual payout ratios. The payout
ratios are, however, within the calculated range.
Australia’s and Germany’s speed of adjustments are the highest among
the five countries. This means that these countries adjust their dividend
payments very quickly to changes in earnings.
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CHAPTER 8

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

I. Summary
There are some significant differences in dividend payout ratios, dividend
yields and dividend growth rates between Australia, France, Germany, Japan
and United States between 1983 and 1991. Australia has the highest dividend
payout ratios, dividend yield and dividend growth rates. The French dividend
payout ratios are the lowest while the Japanese dividend yield and dividend
growth rates are the lowest
The tax effects hypothesis is used to make predictions on the effects of
tax law changes on dividend payout ratios. It is predicted that the payout ratios
in France, Germany, Japan and U.S. should decrease while there should be an
no significant change in the payout ratios in Australia if it is assumed that
dividend income taxes were not paid before the tax law change. The paired ttest, the Sign test and the Wilcoxon sign rank tests are used to test for
significant changes after the tax law change. The results show that there were
insignificant changes in dividend payout ratios in Australia, Germany and U.S.
The dividend payout ratios decreased in France but the three tests used to test
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for significant changes provide contradictory results which makes it difficult to
make any general inferences. There was also a significant decrease in dividend
payout ratios in Japan and the three tests confirm this significance. The results
of the effects of tax law changes on dividend payout ratios are therefore
generally inconclusive.
The dividend payout ratios were also adjusted for macro economic
effects by using interest rates as a covariate and the means of the adjusted and
unadjusted payout ratios are similar. This suggests that interest rates do not
affect payout ratios.
The validity of the tax effects hypothesis is also tested by examining the
relationship between expected return and dividend yield using a modified
Capital Asset Pricing Model. The relationship between expected return and
dividend yield in Japan and U.S. before and after the tax law change is positive
and significant These countries have higher total effective tax rates on dividend
income than on capital gains. The relationship between expected return and
dividend yield is insignificant in Australia before and after the tax law change.
This is also consistent with the tax effects hypothesis because shareholders in
Australia are supposed to be indifferent to dividend income or capital gains if
they do not pay dividend income taxes. The insignificant relationship in
Germany (before the tax law change) and the positive relationship in France
and Germany (after the tax law change) suggest that the marginal investors
may be in the top tax bracket
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The results also show that there is a shift in dividend yield coefficient
The coefficient increased significantly in France and Germany after the tax law
change when the tax disadvantage of dividend income increased. The changes
in the dividend yield coefficient for Australia, Japan and U.S. are insignificant
These results therefore generally support the tax effects hypothesis.
Countries with higher effective tax rates on dividend income have a positive
relationship between expected return and dividend yield. This suggests that
dividends have a negative effect on the value of a firm.
Lintner's partial adjustment model is able to explain the dividend behavior
of firms in countries other than U.S. The addition of a size variable does not
add very much to the explanatory power of the regressions even though the
coefficient of the size variable is significant The calculated payout ratios for
Australia, France and U.S. are not significantly different from the actual payout
ratios. The calculated payout ratios for Germany and Japan are lower than the
actual payout ratios but are within the calculated range of payout ratios.
Australia and Germany have the highest speed of adjustments among the five
countries suggesting that they adjust their dividend payments very quickly to
changes in earnings. Brittain’s claim that the use of a cash flow variable
improves the predictive power of Lintner’s model is not substantiated in this
study.
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II. Practical Implications for Research Results
The results of this study support the notion that tax policies may have
significant impact on economic stability and growth through their effects on
corporate retention or payout France, Japan and Germany increased the tax
advantage accorded capital gains after the tax law change and the dividend
payout ratios in these countries decreased even though insignificantly in some
cases. Australia did not significantly change the tax position of investors and
there was no significant change in the payout ratios. These results suggest that
the tax policy instituted by a country may change the dividend pattern of firms if
there is enough incentives to do so. Countries can therefore use tax policies to
promote economic growth. A policy that encourages capital gains and
discourages dividend payments may lead to economic growth.
The results of this study also provide evidence consistent with the
hypothesis that dividends have a negative effect on the value of the firm. The
implication for wealth maximizing firms is to pay less dividends.

III. Limitations of the Study
The predictions made in this study are based purely on tax
considerations. The selection of countries that changed their system in the
period provides a unique opportunity to validate the tax effects hypothesis.
However, it is still possible that other factors interact with these tax effects.
Another limitation is the length of time. The use of a longer number of
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years is desirable but this is not possible with this study. Other studies have
used fewer number of years.

The third limitation which is common to other studies is that the firms
used are successful firms who were in operation during the entire nine-year
period. The study did not allow for failures in the sample but this is usually
done to allow for continuity.

IV. Suggestions for Further Research
The generally negative effect of dividend policy on the value of a firm
found in this study needs to be adequately examined by incorporating other
factors. The tax calculations show that in the absolute sense no dividends
should be paid in Australia, France, Japan and U.S. because shareholders are
better off with capital gains than dividend income. Dividends are, however, paid
in these countries, an indication that there are other factors apart from taxes
that affect the dividend policy of firms. A more conclusive result may be
obtained by simultaneously integrating tax effects, information effects and
agency effects.
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APPENDIX A

These tax calculations are based on the following assumptions:
1. Tax payers are in the top marginal tax bracket
2. Tax payers are in the top capital gains tax bracket
3. Tax payers only face federal government tax

Notations:
T is the corporate tax rate on distributed profit,
T* is the corporate tax rate on retained profit,
M is the personal tax rate,
g is the capital gains tax rate and
c is the partial credit rate.

123

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

AUSTRALIA BEFORE 1987

Corporate tax rate:

46.00%

Personal tax rate on dividends:

60.00%

Capital gains tax rate:

60.00%

Scenario 1: All Corporate Earnings Are Paid Out To Shareholders
As Dividends
Corporate tax liability

=

T

Personal tax liability

=

(1 - T)M

Total tax liability

=

T + (1 - T)M
0.46 + 0.3240

Effective tax rate

=

78.40%

Scenario 2: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends But
Capital Gains Are Realized
Corporate tax liability

=

T

Personal tax liability

=

(1-T)g

Total tax liability

=

T + (1-T)g*
0.46 + 0.3240

Effective tax rate

=

78.40%

* In Australia m = g before and after the tax law change.
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Scenario 3: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends And
Capital Gains Are Not Realized

Corporate Tax Liability

=

T

Personal Tax Liability

=

0

Total Tax Liability

=

T
0.46

Effective Tax Rate

=

46.0%

AUSTRALIA AFTER 1987
Corporate tax rate:

49.00%

Personal tax rate on dividends:

48.30%

Personal tax rate on capital gains:

48.30%

Scenario 1: All Corporate Earnings Are Paid Out To Shareholders
As Dividends
Corporate tax liability

=

T

Personal tax liability

=

Total tax liability

=

T + (M- T)
0.49

Effective tax rate

=

49.00%

[(1 - T) + T]M - T = (M - 7)

Total tax liability in Australia is M (if M > T) and T (if M < T), but the highest marginal tax
rate is 48.3% which is less than T. This means that effectively total tax liability is T.
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Scenario 2: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends But
Capital Gains Are Realized
Corporate tax liability

=

T

Personal tax liability

=

0

Total tax liability

=

T
0.49

Effective tax rate

—

49.00%

Scenario 3: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends And
Capital Gains Are Not Realized
Corporate Tax Liability

=

T

Personal Tax Lability

=

0

Total Tax Lability

=

T
0.49

Effective Tax Rate

=

49.00%
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FRANCE BEFORE THE 1989 TAX LAW CHANGE

Corporate tax rate:

50.00%

Personal tax rate on dividends:

57.90%

Personal tax rate on capital gains:

15.00%

Partial credit rate:

50.00%

Scenario 1: All Corporate Earnings Are Paid Out To Shareholders
As Dividends
Corporate tax liability

=

T

Personal tax liability

=

[(1-T) +c(1-T)]M - c(1-T)
[M + Me - c][1 - TJ

Total tax liability

=

T + [M + Me - c][1 -7]
0.50 + 0.1843

Effective tax rate

=

68.43%

Scenario 2: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends But
Capital Gains Are Realized
Corporate tax liability

=

T

Personal tax liability

=

(1 -7)g*

Total tax liability

=

T + (1-T)g
0.50 + 0.075

Effective Tax Rate

=

57.50%

The 15% capital gains tax rate in France is a flat rate that applies if the proceeds from the sale
of shares exceed FF251.500 (equivalent to $41,508 in 1988) per year or if the shareholder
holds more than 25% of the shares in a company. However, if the capital gains taxes are not
paid this will not change the hypothesis because It wOl only affect the realized capital gains
option.
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Scenario 3: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends And
Capital Gains Are Not Realized

Corporate Tax Lability

=

T

Personal Tax Lability

=

0

Total Tax Lability

=

T
0.50

Effective Tax Rate

=

50.00%

FRANCE AFTER THE 1989 TAX LAW CHANGE
Corporate tax rate on distributed profit:

42.00%

Corporate tax rate on retained profit (T*):

34.00%

Personal tax rate on dividends:

57.90%

Personal tax rate on capital gains:

18.10%

Partial credit rate:

50.00%

Scenario 1: All Corporate Earnings Are Paid Out To Shareholders
As Dividends
Corporate tax liability

=

T

Personal tax liability

=

[(1-T) + c(1-T)]M - c(1-T)
[M + Me - c][1 - T]

Total tax liability

=

T + [M + Me- c][1 -T|
0.42 + 0.2137

Effective tax rate

=

63.37%
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Scenario 2: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends But
Capital Gains Are Realized

Corporate tax liability

=

T*

Personal tax liability

=

(1 -T^g

Total tax liability

=

T* + (1-T*)g*
0.34 + 0.1195

Effective tax rate

=

45.95%

Scenario 3: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends And
Capital Gains Are Not Realized

Corporate tax liability

=

T”

Personal tax liability

=

0

Total tax liability

=

T*
0.34

Effective tax rate

=

34.00%

The 18.1% capital gains tax rate in France is a flat rate that applies if the proceeds from the
sale of shares exceed FF307.600 (equivalent to $53,246 in 1989) per year or if the
shareholder holds more than 25% of the shares in a company.
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GERMANY BEFORE 1990

Corporate tax rate on distributed profit:

36.00%

Corporate tax rate on retained profit (T*):

56.00%

Personal tax rate on dividends:

56.00%

Personal tax rate on capital gains:

0.00%

Scenario 1: All Corporate Earnings Are Paid Out To Shareholders
As Dividends
Corporate tax liability

=

T

Personal tax liability

=

[(1-T)+7]M -T
M -T

Total tax liability

=

T + (M - T)
M
0.56

Effective tax rate

=

56.00%

Scenario 2: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends But
Capital Gains Are Realized
Corporate tax liability

=

T*

Personal tax liability

=

0

Total tax liability

=

T*
0.56

Effective tax rate

=

56.00%
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Scenario 3: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends And
Capital Gains Are Not Realized

Corporate tax liability

=

T°

Personal tax liability

=

0

Total tax liability

=

T*
56

Effective tax rate

=

56.00%

GERMANY AFTER THE TAX LAW CHANGE
Corporate tax rate on distributed profit:

36.00%

Corporate tax rate on retained profit (T8):

50.00%

Personal tax rate on dividends:

53.00%

Persona] tax rate on capital gains:

0.00%

Scenario 1: All Corporate Earnings Are Paid Out To Shareholders
As Dividends
Corporate tax liability

=

T

Personal tax liability:

=

[(1 - T)+ T]M - T
M -T

Total tax liability

=

T + (M - T)
M
0.53

Effective tax rate

=

53.00%
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Scenario 2: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends But
Capital Gains Are Realized

Corporate tax liability

=

7*

Personal tax liability

=

0

Total tax liability

=

T8
0.50

Effective tax rate

=

50.00%

Scenario 3: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends And
Capital Gains Are Not Realized

Corporate tax liability

=

T*

Personal tax liability

=

0

Total tax liability

=

T*
0.50

Effective tax rate

=

50.00%
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JAPAN BEFORE APRIL 1990

Corporate tax rate on distributed profit:

32.00%

Corporate tax rate on retained profit (T*):

42.00%

Personal tax rate on dividends:

57.00%

Personal tax rate on capital gains:

0.00%

Partial credit rate:

5.00%

Scenario 1: All Corporate Earnings Are Paid Out To Shareholders
As Dividends
Corporate tax liability
Personal tax liability

(1-T)M - c(1-T)
(M - c)(1-T)

Total tax liability

T + (M - c)0 -T)
0.32 + 0.3536

Effective tax rate

67.36%

Scenario 2: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends But
Capital Gains Are Realized
Corporate tax liability

f*

Personal tax liability

0

Total tax liability

T*
0.42

Effective tax rate

42.00%
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Scenario 3: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends And
Capital Gains Are Not Realized

Corporate tax liability

=

T*

Personal tax liability

=

0

Total tax liability

=

T*
0.42

Effective tax rate

=

42.00%

JAPAN AFTER APRIL 1990
Corporate tax rate:

37.50%

Personal tax rate on dividends:

35.00%

Personal tax rate on capital gains:

20.00%*

Partial credit rate:

5.00%

Scenario 1: All Corporate Earnings Are Paid Out To Shareholders
As Dividends
Corporate tax liability

=

T

Personal tax liability

=
=

[(1-T)]M - c(1-T)
(M-c)(1--Q

Total tax liability

=

T + (M - c)(1 -T)
0.375 + 0.1875

Effective tax rate

=

56.25%

*The 20% capital gains tax rate in Japan is a flat rate.
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Scenario 2: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends But
Capital Gains Are Realized

T

Corporate tax liability
Personal tax liability

=

(1 -T)g

Total tax liability

=

T + (1-T)g
0.375 + 0.125
50.00%

Effective tax rate

Scenario 3: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends And
Capital Gains Are Not Realized
Corporate tax liability

=

T

Personal tax liability

=

0

Total tax liability

=

T
0.375

Effective tax rate

=

37.50%
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U.S. BEFORE 1986

Corporate tax rate:

46.00%

Personal tax rate on dividends:

50.00%

Capital gains tax rate:

20.00%

Scenario 1: All Corporate Eai
As Dividends

Are Paid Out To Shareholders

Corporate tax liability:

T

Personal tax liability

(1 - T)M

Total tax liability

T + (1 -T)M
0.46 + 0.27

Effective tax rate

73.00%

Scenario 2: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends But
Capital Gains Are Realized
Corporate tax liability

T

Personal tax liability

(1-T)g

Total tax liability

T + (1 -T)g
0.46 + 0.108

Effective tax rate

56.80%
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Scenario 3: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends And
Capital Gains Are Not Realized

Corporate tax liability

T

Personal tax liability

0

Total tax liability

T
0.46

Effective tax rate

46.0%

U.S. AFTER 1986

Corporate tax rate:

34.00%

Personal tax rate on dividends:

31.00%

Capital gains tax rate:

31.00%

Scenario 1: All Corporate Earnings Are Paid Out To Shareholders
As Dividends
Corporate tax liability

T

Personal tax liability

(1 - T)M

Total tax liability

T + (1 - T)M
0.34 + 0.2046

Effective tax rate

54.46%
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Scenario 2: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends But
Capital Gains Are Realized

Corporate Tax Liability

T

Personal Tax Liability

=

0-T)g

Total Tax Lability

=

T + (1 -T)g
0.34 + 0.2046

Effective Tax Rate

54.46%

Scenario 3: Corporate Earnings Are Not Paid Out As Dividends And
Capital Gains Are Not Realized
Corporate tax liability

T

Personal tax liability

0

Total tax liability
Effective tax rate

= ' T
0.34
34.0%
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